Illinois State University

ISU ReD: Research and eData
Theses and Dissertations
10-13-2014

Troubled Waters: Security, Economic Development, And The
Senkaku/diaoyu Islands.
Kevin McKenzie
Illinois State University, kevin.m.mckenzie@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd
Part of the History Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political Science
Commons

Recommended Citation
McKenzie, Kevin, "Troubled Waters: Security, Economic Development, And The Senkaku/diaoyu Islands."
(2014). Theses and Dissertations. 277.
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/277

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more
information, please contact ISUReD@ilstu.edu.

TROUBLED WATERS: SECURITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS

Kevin McKenzie
118 Pages

December 2014

This project uses a case-study approach to investigate the factors driving the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute between Japan and the People’s Republic of China.
Drawing on historical and economic evidence, this research explores the role of trade
interdependence in shaping the territorial dispute

TROUBLED WATERS: SECURITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS

KEVIN MCKENZIE

A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Department of Politics and Government
ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
2014

© 2014 Kevin McKenzie

TROUBLED WATERS: SECURITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS

KEVIN MCKENZIE

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Michaelene Cox, Chair
T.Y. Wang
Sherri Replogle
Louis Perez

CONTENTS
Page
CONTENTS

i

FIGURES

iii

CHAPTER
I.

II.

III.

INTRODUCTION

1

Overview
Methods
Organization

1
3
6

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

7

Regime Insecurity Theory
Liberal Peace Theory

8
12

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Territory
Legitimacy
Economics

IV.

20
20
25
29

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

33

Sino-Japanese War
The Fishing Expedition
The First Lighthouse Incident
The Second Lighthouse Incident
2005 Flare-up and the Race for Natural Resources
2012 Flare-up and the Nationalization Crisis

i

33
35
39
40
42
44

V.

ECONOMIC CONTEXT

47

Japan: Industry from Ashes
China: Newcomer and Giant
Economic Interdependence
VI.

47
51
60

POLITICAL CONTEXT

65

Japanese Politics
Japanese Political Parties and Factions
Chinese Politics
Competing Nationalists
VII. ANALYSIS

66
68
72
78
87

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

107

Policy Recommendations
Openings for Future Research
Summary
REFERENCES

107
111
112
114

ii

FIGURES
Figure

Page

1.

Map of East China Sea

34

2.

PRC Budgetary Revenue Responds to Reform

54

3.

SOE Employment with Estimated Data

55

4.

Main Sources of FDI to China

58

5.

Total PRC Imports and Exports as Percent of GDP

61

6.

China’s Balance of Trade with Japan

62

7.

Trade Dependency between Japan and China

63

8.

Trade Dependency between Japan and China Overlaid with Disputes

iii

100

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Two American B-52 bombers departed Guam on November 25, 2013. Their
flight, reportedly part of a long-planned training exercise, was unarmed. At 7PM local
time, the bomber wing crossed into the Chinese military’s Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ), unilaterally imposed just two days prior, overlapping both the South
Korean and Japanese aerial cordons.1 As they flew over the Senkaku Islands, known as
the Diaoyu in mainland China and the Diaoyutai to Taiwan, the American aircrews were
determining Beijing’s intentions. In declaring their aerial cordon over the contested
islands, China required passing civil and military aircraft to identify themselves and obey
instructions of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. Noncompliance would be met
with vaguely defined “defensive emergency measures” as far as 130KM into the East
China Sea.2 In traversing the zone, the American bombers determined just what China
would do to respond to violations of its newly expanded territorial markers: nothing, for
now.
The establishment of the Chinese ADIZ is the latest escalation in a series of
disputes stemming from the Japanese government effectively nationalizing the
1

“US Bombers Challenge China’s Air Defense Identification Zone,” The Diplomat, accessed October 12,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/us-bombers-challenge-chinas-air-defense-identification-zone/.
2
“China Imposes Restrictions on Air Space Over Senkaku Islands,” The Diplomat, accessed October 12,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-imposes-restrictions-on-air-space-over-senkaku-islands/.
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Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012. The inhospitable and uninhabited islets, administered
by the Japanese since 1895, have been actively disputed by the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) since the discovery of petroleum reserves nearby in the 1970s. The most
recent flare-up of this dispute has led to close encounters under uncertain rules-ofengagement by military aircraft of the world’s three largest economies, two of them
nuclear armed. As time passes without a diplomatic settlement of the dispute, the risk for
miscalculation or accidental escalation increases, and the stakes could not be higher.
The International Monetary Fund predicts that fully twenty-five percent of global
economic growth will occur in China over the coming decade.3 East Asia, and Northeast
Asia in particular, is poised to re-center global productivity, with the region experiencing
unprecedented economic dynamism. These leaps in development disrupt the balance of
power undergirding a tenuous if longstanding peace. New economic realities translate
into new military capabilities for developing nations. The security situation in the region
is dangerous, with the world’s highest concentration of lethal military force.4 Three of the
original five permanent members of the UN Security Council maintain permanent bases
there, all of them nuclear armed. Flashpoints are numerous, and Asia has the dubious
distinction of housing the world’s highest concentration of divided states. The violence of
the Pacific War and subsequent bad relations poison efforts at reconciliation, and
nowhere is that heritage more acrimonious than between Japan and China, the region’s
leading powers. 5

3

“Country and Region Specific Forecasts and Data,” accessed October 12, 2014,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/data.
4
T. J. Pempel, The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia (Routledge, 2013), 2.
5
Also known as the Pacific Theater of World War II in the United States and Europe.
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This project seeks to explain the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with an eye toward
possible solutions. At its most elementary level, the dispute stems from the Japanese
acquisition of the uninhabited islets following the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. As the
provenance of this acquisition is hotly disputed, the historical roots of the conflict will
offer a baseline of context for considering the territorial dispute. Economic growth
proceeds unabated, redefining the regional and global balance of power in favor of the
developing nations of East Asia, most particularly China. In investigating the fraught
relationship between the Chinese and Japanese government, it is important to note that
each nation represents the other’s largest or second largest trading partner. With
theoretical backing, we will analyze the effects of economic interaction on territorial
disputes in this dyad. Given the Chinese and Japanese governments’ continued conflict
despite a professed focus on economic development, economics will not solely explain
the Senkaku dispute. To round out this analysis, political systems and developments will
be considered to determine possible agitants to inter-Asian relations. This project will add
to the understanding of the Senkaku Dispute literature by carrying existing economic
analyses one step further, investigating possible political obstacles to the formation of
trade-based cooperation.
Methods
This study employs a case-study method, analyzing each of the six major
Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes between 1970 and 2013. Historical details are confirmed
through multiple sources wherever possible, as the issues discussed are substantially
disputed by competing chronologies. Economic data provides a broad picture of the
developing relationship between Japan and China, belying the difficult diplomatic
3

environment. We will consider trade throughput and trade dependency between the two
nations for additional context into the conflict. As the conflict persists despite intense
economic entanglement, this study will also consider political systems and popular
groups, in particular comparing nationalist organizations. As case-studies form the basis
of our argument, the results will not be generalizable, but rather will specifically describe
the relationship between China and Japan. Further, this method does not suggest
causality, leaving room for alternate explanations for the events and phenomena
described.
This project relies on a two-part hypothesis. The first hypothesis is concerned
with the perception of regime security by policymakers in China.
H ₁: As China is more secure, there will be more severe conflict over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Here, China’s security is measured by its economic vitality, specifically in its gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita. In keeping with regime insecurity theory, security
will be considered as a regime’s safety from internal and external challengers to power.
As China devotes a substantial portion of its fast-rising GDP to a capable domestic and
international security apparatus, this linkage is justified. Further, statements of Chinese
policymakers link economic vitality to the maintenance of social order and government
control in the domestic sphere.
To measure this hypothesis, individual instances of conflict will be considered
according to the list of major Senkaku/Diaoyu Island disputes as recorded by Min Gyo
Koo. Severity will be measured on a continuum, with the diplomatic disputes being
4

separated into three categories. Flare-ups of the dispute without substantial violent
protests in China or Japan and lacking related military posturing will be classified as
minor. Disputes which progress into substantial violent protests or an escalation of
military posturing will be classified as moderate. Open, armed conflict between China
and Japan (or allied powers) over the islands will be classified as a severe dispute.
Measures of severity will be confirmed by the mention of non-isolated incidents of
violence during protests in reputable, international media sources. Reputable international
media reports will also be used to define Chinese or Japanese military operations as being
linked to the dispute.
The second hypothesis concerns the economic interdependence between China
and Japan.
H ₂: As China and Japan become more economically interdependent, conflict will
be less severe over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
In keeping with liberal peace theory, trade likely plays a restraining role in Sino-Japanese
relations. To measure this expectation, trade dependency will be used as a metric of
economic entanglement. Trade dependency will be measured as the sum of imports and
exports from a given country, divided by the GDP of the country of study. This statistic
will be measured for both China and Japan. Severity of conflict over the islands will
retain the same definition as in the first hypothesis.
Taken in tandem, these two hypotheses offer a formal statement of the
expectations of this project. A number of factors drive the Senkaku dispute, with
economics providing a linkage between disparate influences, such as the electoral politics
5

of Japan or the domestic power struggles of China. Prosperity has empowered the
Chinese state, allowing it to pursue policies to secure itself internationally. As the relative
threat of international actors wanes for China, an incentive for cooperation disappears.
The comparative gains of domestic legitimacy to be had in raising old territorial
disagreements are thus more appealing. Paradoxically, the international trade which has
lent to this economic empowerment also represents one of the few remaining restraints
against belligerent policymaking in the region. Our hypotheses are structured to reflect
the complex relationship between prosperity and cooperation in this dyad.
Organization
We begin this discussion with a summary of major theoretical works which
explain the relationship between economics, regime security, and peace. A broad review
of related literature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute follows, organized into clusters by the
author’s opinion of the primary root of the dispute. The fourth chapter of this discussion,
the history section, will offer a chronological report of island flare-ups and major
diplomatic developments between 1970 and 2013. The fifth chapter focuses on economic
systems and trade, reporting on the form and comparative size of related economies. The
sixth chapter offers a brief description of political systems, including recent
developments in government for both China and Japan, with a special focus on the
acceptance of nationalist sentiments. The seventh chapter analyzes the body of historical
and statistical evidence and applies it to answering our hypotheses. The eighth and final
chapter offers policy suggestions and concluding comments on the Senkaku dispute.

6

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
The theoretical basis of this project seeks to explain the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.
No simple and satisfactory explanation for the persistence of the dispute exists. The
conflict is a puzzle due to the insignificant value of the disputed land, particularly when
weighed against the vital regional trade ties that the dispute endangers. As such, this
project will consider regime insecurity theory and liberal peace theory as theoretical
lenses for interpreting the conflict. Of principal importance will be the perception of
regime security. Given the massive flux of power into East Asia since the end of the Cold
War, as represented by economic and military growth, regional governments now face
novel challenges in governance. With a flexible and adaptive parliamentary democracy,
Japan has experienced frequent cabinet changes, hardly a challenge to the governing
system. For China, the result is a changing sense of risk, not only to individual leadership
cadres, but to the governing system of the Chinese Communist Party itself. We will
consider how this perception of risk fuels an otherwise perplexing record of Chinese
government policies, oscillating between international cooperation and strident refutation
of diplomatic norms. To start our discussion, we will consider the role of insecure
regimes in addressing international disputes.

7

Regime Insecurity Theory
To explain the regime insecurity framework, we begin by considering what is at
stake in international disputes. As China is the nation reacting most severely to the
perception of insecurity, authoritarian governments will be the focus of analysis. China,
with its economic power on the rise, is insulated against foreign threats. As such, China
has room to maneuver internationally, with no proximal and equivalent opponent to
constrain it. Raising tensions then would cost the Chinese government little, and offer
domestic payoffs. In the study of developing nation governance, a group in power
balancing against the most pressing foreign or domestic threat is referred to as omnibalancing. While a government might seek to ward off a foreign power, particularly one
with outstanding territorial disagreements, cooperation might be the best technique to
entrench the existing government at home. M. Taylor Fravel offers up several possible
factors influencing the deployment of omni-balance.
In the face of serious internal threats, often the most serious challengers to
authoritarian regimes, Fravel describes the advantages of international cooperation. The
first advantage is the possibility of material advantages, such as denying insurgent
factions physical resources or a source of legitimacy. Along the border of the far
provinces of China, where neighboring nations are more reflective of the local ethnic
balance than the coastal center in Beijing, this motivation is particularly pronounced. The
second advantage is to free up resources from defending borders from external intrusion
for addressing internal resistance. This creates an incentive for cooperation, even if only
momentarily, during periods of great unrest, such as the early 1990s challenge which
ended in the Tiananmen Square massacre. The third advantage is the enhanced legitimacy
8

a government enjoys when it gains international recognition, a credential denied to
domestic opponents.6 Fravel sums up the motivations for their apparent paradox:
When leaders face internal threats, they may also cooperate to enhance their
external security and preempt potential attempts by other states to profit from
their domestic woes. These effects of regime insecurity are paradoxical: efforts to
consolidate political power at home, often through repression, produce efforts to
cooperate abroad. While such behavior is peaceful, its source is not necessarily
benign.7

These inducements determine the cost and benefit perception for leadership
cadres. Ultimately, a government can take three basic stances to respond to territorial
disputes. The government can accelerate the dispute, pressing the claim more vigorously
or incorporating military force. Risk is high in pursuing military force, however,
endangering the aggressor’s domestic legitimacy in the case of failure. Even success is
risky, as international accession to the new territorial status quo is far from assured. The
government can concede the disputed territory, perhaps in exchange for treaty-negotiated
perks or joint sovereignty. Obviously, this carries large costs to domestic legitimacy. In
China, where government-led historical discussions focus on past unequal-treaties and
Nationalist Party collaboration with the imperial Japanese, the cost of hard compromises
are particularly unpalatable.8 The final general strategy is to delay, claiming sovereignty
in public pronouncements, but not moving to settle the dispute. Delaying also has its
costs, but mostly external.

6

M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in
Territorial Disputes,” International Security, 2005. 52.
7
Ibid.., 52.
8
Ibid., 53.
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The delaying strategy as a negotiating technique allows domestic consolidation at
the price international provocation. In the Chinese case, the former is of paramount
importance, while the ostensible costs of the latter are weighed as acceptable. By leaving
territorial disputes open, the Communist regime can maneuver for maximally favorable
terms while running little risk of domestic disruption. In the event of risks to internal
hegemony over China, the leadership clique can adopt a conciliatory holding position, to
minimize the negative diplomatic effects of an ongoing dispute.9 This strategy allows for
the issue to be reopened when conditions are favorable, giving the Chinese government
little incentive to definitively compromise on disputes. To bolster domestic support by
rallying to the flag and off-balancing other possible claimants to domestic legitimacy
(namely Taiwan), the PRC can also vituperate during the delay, raising regional
nationalist sentiments to bolster home support.
It is important to note special limitations for considering Communist China as a
rational, risk-parsing regime with a focus on maintaining domestic hegemony. During
certain historical events that effect governmental control over governance, regime
insecurity theory does not offer accurate behavioral predications, such as during the
Cultural Revolution. One leadership faction undertook the radical agrarian and economic
reforms without expectation that it would create vulnerabilities to domestic challenge. By
the time those vulnerabilities surfaced, much of the government had ceased to function,
including the often-distrusted Foreign Ministry.10 As such, land disputes during this
unique historical event, characterized by chaos in governance and low-intensity civil war,
do not follow the regime insecurity mold.
9

Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 63.

10

10

Regime instability theory makes constant reference to the relative power of
competing states to understand a given government’s interactions with the outside world.
This power can be expressed militarily, but can also be comprised of other factors that
may give a nation influence over another. Economic growth is one engine which propels
states toward positions of dominance over one another. This growth is also a principal
cause for cooperation, as in many instances conflict disrupts trade.11 The stability of
governments (and China in particular for this study) is influenced by their economic
performance, making cooperation doubly important. Fravel theorizes that uneven
economic growth can create incentives for violent challenges to regional order.12
Economic growth is only one measure of regime security, and Fravel points to sharp
increases in internal security spending in China as a sign of domestic threats being
considered the greatest to regime security there.13
In cases of good economic performance, and subsequently high power, regime
insecurity theory predicts a more vocal assertion of disputed territorial claims. This is
theoretically complicated in China’s case, as some of the disputed territories are currently
administered by Japan, a nation which contributes substantially to China’s economic
growth. To parse out these contradictions, we will lean on the wider theoretical
discussion of economics in international cooperation.

11

Ibid., 53.
M. Taylor Fravel, “Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of
Noncombat Operations in China,” Asian Security 7, no. 3 (September 2011): 177–200,
doi:10.1080/14799855.2011.615080, 179.
13
Ibid., 194.
12

11

Liberal Peace Theory
According the liberal peace theorists, economic entanglement is a central driver of
cooperative behavior between states. As the value of trade ties increases, the comparative
risk of belligerent behavior becomes less appealing. In this study, mutually beneficial
trade will be weighed for its impact on individual economies to observe for a possible
pacifying effect. Economic inhibitors to war are central to liberal peace theory, but only
one of several layers of analysis. We will begin at the most basic level and work our way
to economic systems.
The basis for liberal peace stems from common philosophical antecedents which
are important to recognize distinctly. For instance, at the individual level, the Hobbesian
description of man’s natural state provides the impetus for organizing a government.
According the Hobbes, men individually possess equivalent power, and without law there
is no disincentive to preemptive violence.14 The resultant natural system is anarchic, with
men insecure in their wealth and unable to gain the benefits of collective labor. A selfish
desire for personal wealth leads individuals to cede liberty to rulers, either despots or
republics, to create a framework for secure and prosperous living. This individual level
desire for security is extended to an assumption of an individual desire for peace.
These individual level desires are transformed into governmental prerogatives
through a series of relationships described by Morasevic in Taking Preferences Seriously.
Not all Hobbesian assumptions can be extended to governmental behavior; for instance, a
government does not fear the risk of violence in the same manner as an individual. A
14

Newbrander, David, “Liberal Peace: A Dyad of Democray and Economic Interdependence, Grounded in
Agent Desires,” The Monitor Journal of International Studies 18, no. 1 (2012), 35.
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government does, however, respond to inducements like an individual. Through
intermediary representative institutions, a government seeks to maintain power by
answering citizen calls to action.15 Ignoring these calls is costly, even for an authoritarian
regime. It is important to note that all groups are not necessarily equal within a
representative institution. With this inherent inequality of forces, a rational profitmaximizing approach does not inevitably prevail. Actions are determined by pressure
from most dominant groups within government.16
This pattern of behaviors explains why nations may fight over contested land,
despite an acknowledged preference of individuals toward peace. A government seeks to
maximize rewards for its own citizens, but carries separate decision criteria from the
individuals. Peace is not a mandate of successful representation in the Hobbesian
model.17 Liberal peace theorists point to other interlocking tendencies of government to
explain a perceived increase in cooperative behavior over time. For instance, forms of
government matter. As conflict arises from an incompatibility of preferences, common
ground reduces the instance of conflict. Democracies are thus predicted to war with one
another less frequently. By the same token, economically interdependent nations are less
likely to risk their trade ties for the possibility of war spoils down the road.18
The question of frequency is central to Morasevic’s contribution to the body of
liberal peace literature. Of course, counterpoint examples of aggressive democracies and
restrained autocracies abound. This is particularly important when considering
15

Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,”
International Organization, 1997, 519.
16
Ibid., 520.
17
Newbrander, David, “Liberal Peace: A Dyad of Democray and Economic Interdependence, Grounded in
Agent Desires.” 39.
18
Ibid., 39.
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Communist China, which despite much saber-rattling and showmanship has not engaged
in a ground war since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam. In Morasevic’s view, this
probabilistic tendency of economic partners and democracies to avoid warfare is a
function of systems rather than good intent. Autocratic governments, lacking the
representative institutions and safeguards of the republics, wield power more arbitrarily.19
As such, a wider range of behaviors can be expected from autocracies. This
unpredictability leads to autocracies, on average, engaging in more conflicts than their
representative counterparts.
Particularly among republican governments, certain ideological and structural
forms are suggested as inhibitors to belligerence. A common ethical basis at the
individual level, stemming from a tendency of republican citizens to avoid bloodshed to
solve domestic matters, extends to the international level through representative
institutions. Governing structure also contributes to the prediction of fewer wars among
the republics, as a broad-based decision-making process involves more self-interested
voices who are averse to risking themselves in international violence.20
This broad basis of public support, stemming from majoritarian rule, is a focus of
Kant’s republic, another philosophical basis for liberal peace theory. It is important to
note that this so-called republic describes the result rather than the system: Kant’s
republic could be a responsive constitutional monarchy, or any number of systems other
than a modern representative democracy. The important qualifying factors which make a
government republican in the Kantian sense are as follows: individual freedom, rule of

19
20

Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously.” 532.
Ibid., 40.
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law, and the citizens’ assent to legal coercion.21 This non-normative form of government
sets a framework for citizens to coexist in, intervening only where individuals infringe on
one another’s liberties and only then in accordance with the law. These factors influence
the likelihood of war by enshrining liberal individual actions as a framework for
government. A group of such nations respond to selfish individual impulses toward nonaggression, thus creating safety through homogeneity.
A modern, concise summary of liberal peace theory exists in Michael Doyle’s
“Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace”. The core precepts are drawn from Kant’s “Perpetual
Peace” published in 1795, and the relationship is demonstrated in the titular three pillars.
These key factors which discourage conflict between liberal states are as follows:
republican representation, respect of human rights, and transnational interdependence.22
The three pillars work in tandem, but not separately, to explain the tendency of
liberal states to avoid war with one another. As described previously, liberal peace
presumes that individuals prefer peace, with its low risks and personal prosperity. In an
accountable democracy, the median voter is well represented, whereas despotism relies
on a much smaller body of sometimes unreliable decision-makers. Democratic rulers who
engage in risky behavior, such as bluffing or brash aggression, face electoral defeat.
Additionally, a representative system governed by published rules does much dispel
uncertainty in the behavior of states. This tendency towards relatively clear signaling,

21

Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, “The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited),” American Journal of Political
Science 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 397–414, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00258.x, 400.
22
Michael W. Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” The American Political Science Review, 2005. 463.
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referred to by Kant as republican “publicity,” decreases the odds of international
misinterpretation of risks that might lead to conflict.23
In describing the behavior of liberal states toward one another, Doyle makes an
important distinction lacking in other prominent works on liberal peace theory. Where
individual preferences transform into state preferences, liberal state citizens are described
as perceiving other liberal state citizens as morally similar and guided by the same rules,
and thus the citizens encourage their government toward positive interaction with liberal
states. The opposite is true of liberal state citizens regarding illiberal states: they presume
untrustworthiness, and thus encourage their governments to keep their distance, or worse,
act belligerently. This is a large break from other theorists, and is important for
consideration given the liberal/illiberal dyad represented in the Senkaku dispute.
The final pillar, economic interdependence, is a central concern of this study.
Described by Kant as a pacifying “spirit of commerce,” economic entanglement between
liberal states produces material disincentives toward engaging in conflict.24 Under
mutually beneficial conditions governed by established laws and protocols, liberal states
can jointly achieve greater prosperity than had by states in autarky.25 Additionally,
market forces manage complex and periodically damaging decisions required for
resource optimization. As a result, states do not fully control their prosperity and thus can
be insulated from belligerent feelings generated by market shocks.
In terms of economic interdependence with between liberal and illiberal states,
Doyle offers the example of colonial rule. In this example, the trade between a liberal
23

Ibid., 464.
Ibid., 465.
25
Ibid., 466.
24

16

state and an illiberal one is presumed to generate conflict, due to physical insecurity and
uncertain legal safeties.26 This is one possible economic relationship between a liberal
and illiberal state, but perhaps less relevant to the majority of modern trading dyads. Few
illiberal states can plausibly fear plunder by previous liberal colonial masters. So, in his
final analysis that economic interdependence increases the risk of strife between liberal
and illiberal states, Doyle offers one particular case as a general rule that may no longer
be generally applicable.
The general point of Doyle’s economic theory is important for Sino-Japanese
relations. Particularly where improved ties and cooperation are being sought through
increased economic throughput, it is important to consider the Kantian basis for
economic interdependence leading to greater cooperation. Where mutual benefit is
perceived, as in the majority of interactions where Japanese and Chinese businesses meet
one another’s expectations of propriety, economic entanglement improves relations. In
the event of complications, such as in the relatively rare event of government interference
or popular nationalist boycotts, economic entanglement is another cause for friction in
international relations.
In short, there are diverse viewpoints within the academic discourse of liberal
peace. As a descriptor of global changes to the world international system over time,
Morasevic observes a general trend toward greater economic entanglement. While he
singles out the liberal democracies as enjoying historically unprecedented cooperation,
the process coincides with a rapid expansion of the democratic franchise. As such,
economic relationships do not endanger the peace. Danilovic and Clare run regression
26

Ibid., 466.
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analysis to similar results, albeit with different details. According to the researchers,
while a plurality of political disputes involves at least one liberal party, military
confrontations involving liberal states are quite rare, accounting for fewer than 17 percent
of armed conflicts.27 These results fly in the face of economic success exacerbating
conflict, as liberal powers have outsized economic influence.28 Described previously,
Doyle supposes that the composition of the trading dyad determines its effect. Using a
particular historical circumstance, namely the rise of mercantilism, Doyle argues that
liberal and illiberal partners do not share sufficient normative structures to ensure trading
will go well and improve relations. Thus, the value of economic interdependence is
uncertain, and its war-preventing qualities are lost.
In considering the theoretical framework of territorial disputes involving China, a
complex system emerges. Regime insecurity theory offers a compelling system of
analysis, seeking to explain when governments press their claims as opposed to accepting
compromise. While the PRC does not currently seek expansion beyond old Qing Dynasty
antecedents, the currently claimed territory is sufficiently critical to endanger regional
stability. Economics will likely play a restraining role as suggested by liberal peace
theorists, but it is unclear to what extent the PRC views uncontrolled foreign trade as a
resource. Equally worrisome, with a tight grip on domestic media access, Chinese
government authorities leverage ongoing disputes to stoke anti-foreign sentiments. This
fulfills near-term goals of the PRC, stymying possible challengers to governance by
focusing attention outward, in keeping with the general outlines for regime insecurity set

27

Danilovic and Clare, “The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited),” 408.
Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Free to Trade: Democracies,
Autocracies, and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 2000, 314.
28
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out by Fravel. However, media manipulation is a double-edged sword, as the animosities
generated and kept at the forefront of public attention are very real. PRC policies lay the
groundwork for a future where the cost to domestic legitimacy of inaction may be
considered equal to the international risk of military action. With these theoretical
frameworks in mind, we will consider existing scholarship on the roots of the island
dispute in question.

19

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is contested at its most basic levels by the involved
parties. Academic thinkers from a variety of disciplines analyze the dispute in the hopes
of penetrating the sometimes opaque motivations of the involved nations. Among
observers of regional security in East Asia, there are a multitude of interpretations of the
conflict. Multiple broad arguments figure prominently in the existing literature. We will
consider the full diversity of these arguments, with author’s grouped by their view of the
primary driver of the Senkaku dispute.
Territory
The first group of argument is that the primary cause for the conflict is a genuine
territorial dispute. Authors comment on the intractably different interpretations of recent
history expressed by China and Japan. Broadly, this camp sees the conflict as a result of
political systems and territory, rather than a conflict over resources. In the “Chinese
Leadership Monitor,” Michael Swaine proposes that new CCP leadership under Xi
Jinping consider the Senkaku islets only slightly less important than Taiwan as a
geopolitical goal.29 This is at once alarming and reassuring: on the one hand, the islands
are widely considered Japanese as part of the present status quo, and thus a unilateral
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competitive claim is vexing to regional cooperation. This is particularly destabilizing
with the inclusion of military overflights by the Chinese military. On the other hand,
stated Chinese policy leaves room for an honorable withdrawal by classifying the
Senkaku islets at a lower tier of importance than Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan. The dispute
serves as an agitant outside of the economic sphere, precluding closer relations based on
trade. The icons of increased cooperation, namely factories manufacturing products for
Japanese brands in China, were targeted during substantial unrest in 2012 and 2013.
Legal scholars theorize over formative differences between capitalist and
communist states after World War II, which survive institutionally into the present day.
The author Roda Mushkat discusses the perception of two tracks of international law in
the postwar environment: one set of laws amongst socialist countries, and then a separate
set of laws international laws for capitalist countries. The communist bloc saw
international law as fundamentally hostile and in favor of entrenched capitalist interests.30
In this adversarial context, communist nations developed uncommonly aggressive
negotiating tactics, as internationally mediated solutions were considered rigged.
In the Chinese case, this legal preference is reinforced by a tumultuous history.
The Unequal Treaties with colonial powers played a substantial role in the Century of
Humiliation, a historical precedent that is thoroughly studied by Chinese policymakers.
The authors claim that this historical background is decisive in creating an air of
ambivalence in China with regards to international mediation of territorial disputes.
Sovereign freedom-to-maneuver is considered paramount to policymakers, with armed
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conflict being an acceptable recourse to settle or extend disputes.31 While pragmatic
considerations of strategy allow certain disputes to be resolved with peaceful expedience,
this outlook generally causes territorial disputes to be lengthy and contentious.
Authors from mainland Chinese institutions tend to follow a legal formula as
well. It is important to note that open academic exchange is heavily circumscribed in the
PRC, and these are the views which survived that culling process. In the tellingly named
The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereignty Dispute over the
Diaoyu Islands, scholar Chi Manjiao describes the perceived legitimacy of multiple
treaties reapportioning territory after the war in the Pacific. These include the Treaty of
Shimonoseki in 1895, the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951, and the separate peace treaties
between Japan, Taiwan, and China. The author’s central argument is that formal
agreements shaping the postwar boundaries of Pacific nations unfairly favor the Japanese
and create a framework for ongoing struggle that fuels international tensions.32 Central to
this reading is the long-running dispute over the unlikely, uninhabited Diaoyu islands.
The author reiterates the importance of the Treaty of San Francisco as an example
of exclusive international agreements which disadvantage mainland China. Neither the
People’s Republic of China nor the Republic of China was invited to participate due to
disagreements stemming from their ongoing civil war. Despite highly advantageous
results for Chinese sovereignty, the treaty thus has a pall cast over it by the specter of the
Unequal Treaties. The absence of a Taiwanese protest over the Treaty of San Francisco is
described, in a jab at Taiwanese legitimacy, as a product of American trusteeship and
31

Ibid., 53.
Chi Manjiao, “The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over the
Diaoyu Islands,” East Asia Law Review 6 (October 1, 2011): 163, 174.

32

22

ostensible domination. The mainland Chinese lodged vociferous protests, decrying the
treaty as a unilateral American intervention, in the style of Revolutionary China’s attack
diplomacy.33 In this manner, mainland Chinese scholars explain their claims as having
greater gravity than either Japan or Taiwan, due to continuous contests by the communist
government.
While multiple mainland authors follow this general line of treaty-based
argument, the authors offer a diverse variety of solutions. Chi Manjiao presciently
describes the island dispute as a substantial hindrance to important international
relationships, namely with Japan and the United States. As these are China’s two largest
trading partners, the importance of the relationship is not overstated. The author suggests
that the issue should be resolved, and quickly, although they make no suggestion of
concessions. Other writers fall in line with the tone set by the mainland, state-run media.
Gao Jianjun discusses the same base treaties, detailing Chinese records of interaction
with the disputed islands. From this baseline of evidence, Gao repeats the governmental
claim that the islands are illegally held by the Japanese, and that Chinese sovereignty is
being unfairly restricted.34 This falls in line with the Chinese government course of
action, such as the unilateral establishment of armed military patrols in the airspace of the
disputed islands, which is informed by the assumption of preexisting sovereignty.
One mainland author adds an additional corollary to the familiar claims of
Chinese sovereignty. Zhongqi Pan offers a detailed analysis of the treaty basis for
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Japanese control of the disputed islands. The author cites antiquities sources that
reference the Diaoyu islands as an imperial holding of the Qing dynasty, although
uninhabited. Zhongqi Pan also cites Japanese academic Inoue Kiyoshi’s work, a
sympathetic communist voice, offering similar evidence. While these arguments are
familiar, the author offers a mainland interpretation of the risks of concessions to China’s
goal of annexing Taiwan. As China views the disputed islands as affiliated with the
Taiwanese island chain (as does the Taiwanese government), to offer concessions to
either Japan or Taiwan is seen as dangerous to the PRC’s eventual goal of unification, a
long-held core interest of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhongqi Pan offers the
following analysis, based in PRC policy which regards Taiwan as only temporarily an
independent political body:
China’s softening of its posture on the dispute over the islands with Japan would
not only endanger its claim to the islands themselves, but also jeopardize its claim
to Taiwan by sending wrong signals toward separatist forces in Taiwan that seek
independence. 35

This offers some explanation for the intractability of Chinese claims to the uninhabited
islets, and the seemingly disproportionate risks taken by militarily pressing those claims.
Other authors point to a long pattern of territorial expansion and tribute reaching
into Chinese antiquity as an indicator of core motivations. In his key volume On China,
Henry Kissinger looks to imperial antecedents as the building blocks of contemporary
Chinese foreign policy. During the late Qing Empire, China fell behind western powers
and ultimately regional forces such as Meiji Japan. Crippling losses, such as the capture
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of Southeast Asia by western powers or large island holdings like Formosa and the
Ryukyus by imperial Japan, were seen as temporary set-backs to a culturally superior
empire.36
In seizing indefensible islands from Taiwan in the 1950s, Revolutionary China
followed the imperial precedent of reclaiming territory after its borders fluctuated. Mao
Zedong described the military operation, checked by the American Seventh Fleet prior to
the Taiwanese main islands, as a means to discomfort his Nationalist adversaries and
leave the dispute open for the future.37 This pattern of leaving disputes unresolved until
favorable conditions arise is described as a holdover from Confucian “barbarian
management,” or foreign affairs. Absent notable pragmatists, such as Deng Xiaoping who
Kissinger interacts with extensively during a period of great Chinese vulnerability, the
outlook is described as dim for international cooperation. This view raises particular
concerns given the extensive list of Chinese territorial disputes, covering most its farranging land border and myriad islands distant from the mainland.
Legitimacy
Another school of thought attributes the conflict to internal political struggles.
Included in this interpretation is the theory of regime insecurity fuelling Chinese
government policies. Decisions for increased cooperation or belligerence are calculated
to preserve the CCP as the sole power in mainland China. As such, economics do not
figure into analysis beyond what minimums are required to maintain domestic
legitimacy; as a historical sensitivity to Japanese economic domination preceding
36
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invasion, economic incentives may even draw suspicion from the Chinese leadership
clique. In Regime Insecurity and International Compromise, M. Taylor Fravel suggests
Chinese foreign policy is more aggressive and less compromising during periods of
internal stability.
Fravel links territorial compromise over the course of China’s contentious postrevolutionary period to high levels of domestic political instability.38 For instance, the
Tiananmen Square Movement and later massacre caused Chinese leadership to adopt
cautious foreign policies while addressing internal dissenters. The following succinctly
sums up the PRC’s international reaction to newfound insecurity:
Following the 1989 Tiananmen crisis and worries about the viability of its
socialist system, China attempted compromise in disputes with its socialist
neighbors the Soviet Union, Laos, and Vietnam; in addition, it reached
confidence-building agreements with India and Bhutan.39

Similar patterns can be discerned during periods of revolutionary unrest following World
War II. This raises troublesome possibilities for the future, as China grows in economic
prosperity and authoritarian stability under the direction of the Communist Party.
Economic success reduces the perception of external constraints on Chinese government
policy.
Fravel draws on earlier work by Chiozza and Goemans on causes of regime
instability. Where Fravel comments on the performance of the PRC in the international
arena during periods of instability, Chiozza and Goemans offer insight into periods of
prosperity. In their quantitative approach, they measure the likelihood of states initiating
38
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conflict under a number of conditions. Their work affirms the broad strokes of
democratic peace theory, citing a preponderance of evidence that democracies initiate
conflict less frequently than hybrid or authoritarian regimes.40 Interestingly, they add a
corollary at odds with the economic underpinnings of liberal peace: as nations
experienced economic growth, their leaders enjoyed a higher persistence in office with
fewer threats to rule.41 This increased legitimacy removes constraints against acting on
belligerent preferences. As a result, prosperous states initiated conflict more frequently
than destitute ones.
Other authors have also analyzed the PRC’s perceptions of legitimacy and
international cooperation. Chris Hughes describes the balance struck by Chinese elites
between cooperation with Japan for economic growth on the one hand, and demonization
of Japan for domestic legitimacy on the other hand. In the revolutionary years, where
technological development was low and media control was extremely high, the Chinese
government is described as having strong control over public opinion on the issue. While
past foreign aggression was emphasized to bolster domestic support at home, that tactic
could be balanced with a pragmatic foreign-facing diplomatic front. The contradiction is
described in the following passage:
This perpetuation of memories of Japanese aggression has always had a difficult
relationship with the requirements of foreign policy. While PRC diplomacy has
focused on winning Tokyo’s diplomatic and economic support, in domestic
politics representations of traumatic events such as the Nanjing Massacre have
been used to stir up anti-American patriotism during the Korean War, to
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strengthen national pride after the split with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and to
discredit the [Guomintang] regime on Taiwan.42

This balance could not proceed into the present for a number of reasons. Factions
within China vied to use nationalist politics as a foundation for seizing power in a system
of winner-take-all authoritarianism. As the stakes were high, with the losers facing
ignominious ouster and likely arrest (or worse), playing toward patriotism proved an
irresistible if internationally risky strategy. Jiang Zemin, premier during China’s opening
of the 1990s, was caught in a difficult position. Commercialization of the publishing
industry and increased access to foreign media prevented the government from
simultaneously seeking foreign allies and demonizing them domestically.43 With a
popular movement pushing for restitution from Japan for crimes of the midcentury, Jiang
had to negotiate opposed forces to maintain power and ensure the nascent economic
rejuvenation was not derailed by domestic politics. Ultimately, Jiang suppressed the
popular movement for reparations, but delivered highly inflammatory statements on war
guilt during the PRC’s first visit to Japan by a head of state in 1998. In this system, antiforeign outrage is commodified and played on as a governmental resource. Consider the
following as an insider’s view of the process:
After the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre and the end of the Cold War, the narrative
of resisting Japan was used as a theme of ‘patriotic education’. When the
newly installed CCP General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, celebrated an exhibition on
China’s revolutionary history in 1990, he presented the Nanjing Massacre as a
valuable example that could be used to stir up popular anger. Recommending
the production of special textbooks for this purpose, he stressed how important it
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was to draw attention to negative examples of people who collaborated with
foreign powers or worshipped foreign things and lacked all trace of ‘nationalist
fibre.’ Teaching materials for schools were peppered with stories of
heroic child resistance fighters alongside images of CCP leaders and emblems and
representations of the establishment of the Party, the PLA (People’s Liberation
Army) and the PRC.44
In striking this balance, China’s New Nationalism encouraged frequent rehashing
of past foreign aggression as a way marshaling domestic legitimacy. Individual factions
also vied to outmaneuver competitors by polishing their nationalist credentials, leading to
a brinksman-like competition of foreign provocation. The Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute
proved a durable, recurrent opportunity to establish those credentials. However, as the
Senkaku dispute involved both Hong Kong and Taiwan, popular demonstrations of
nationalism also constrained Chinese decision-making. In the face of a more rigorous
claim to defending Chinese national sovereignty, the Communist Government risked
losing out much as the Guomintang did by being seen as soft on foreign encroachment.45
Hughes describes the combined factors which lead China toward being constrained into
belligerent statements and actions, and offer political capital to internal factions willing to
one-up other belligerents.
Economics
Many observers link security arrangements in East Asia to trade relationships in
the region. These economy-centered analyses fall into two broad camps: liberal observers
predict a decrease in tension between China and Japan as their trade ties deepen. Realists
predict a rising level of tension, as China gains builds its economic advantage into the
military might that Japan constitutionally and culturally rebuffs. In the important
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Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Sino-Japanese political-economic relations, Min Gyo Koo
describes the exponentially expanding trade between China and Japan as a source of
cooperation. Min argues that while the two nations suffer from extreme historic
antipathy, exacerbated by domestic political forces on both sides, trade ensures that the
conflict will remain largely nonviolent.46
This argument is substantively repeated by political theorists who use China as a
case study. Quddus Snyder describes China as a nation midway through the process of
norm socialization. With deviations in line with other emerging economic powers (such
as the United States in the early 1900s), China is viewed as on track to substantial trade
linkages with the world. This liberal view of economics as a peace-keeper would place
China in a position of enforced cooperation and non-belligerence with its important
trading neighbors.47
This view is reinforced by the inclusion of trade data on foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the literature: with surging FDI, the relative weight of economic matters in
national decision making is presumed to increase, with a special focus on remaining in
the good graces of foreign investors.48
Additional authors follow this pattern of analysis, citing economic integration as a
strong moderating force on the contentious Sino-Japanese relationship. Shiro Armstrong
describes Chinese membership in the WTO and earlier confidence-building reforms as a
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foundation for regional trade. With these economic reforms in place, Japanese business
interests have flooded China with FDI and market goods, which have led to a rapidly
growing China and a modest Japanese economic recovery.49 Armstrong sees these
improving trade ties as largely insulated from political conflict, as demonstrated through
analysis of economic trends during periods of high political tension. The author furthers
his point by citing the general trend toward improved relations between China and Japan
since 2001, presumably in comparison to historic lows in the post-war period.
There is by no means a consensus on the effect of increased economic integration
between nations which do not share a political system. Many analyses focus on the
democracy dividend, or the hypothesized tendency of democratic states and trading
partners to avoid war with one another. As China is not a liberal democracy, it may
behave in a very different way to similar stimuli. The Naval War College Review’s
analysis of the Senkaku crisis focuses on the intensifying tensions amidst increased
economic cooperation. Paul J. Smith argues that increased economic integration benefits
the ascendant and revanchist China. The following quote sums up the argument neatly:
First, the power relationship between Japan and the People's Republic of
China, which drives the dynamics of this dispute, is shifting. In the 1970s and,
especially, the 1980s Japan's economic power was unrivaled in East Asia, while
China was comparatively undeveloped and militarily weak. Today the situation
has changed; the countries find themselves in an uneasy balance of relative
military and economic parity. However, current trends appear to favor China.
Japan, while the world's third-largest economy, is undergoing a gradual relative
decline— economically, demographically, and ultimately militarily. Thus,
underlying the bilateral tension over the Senkakus/Diaoyus is a palpable sense of
power transition.50
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This argument is also backed, in broad strokes, by recent statistical research. In
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff’s recent analysis, linkages are established between
belligerent behavior and trade between 1960 and 1990, a core time period for this project.
While trading partners are demonstrated to engage in warfare at a lower rate, the authors
acknowledge a strong tendency for nations to pair off systematically: illiberal states pair
with illiberal states, and vice versa.51 As a result, the predictive capacity of the model is
limited by fewer data points amongst dyads such as modern Japan and China. The rarity
of hybrid pairs and the relative paucity of trade between them suggest troublesome issues
and scarce precedents for a potential trade-based relationship between countries of a
dissimilar political background.
In short, the existing literature on the Senkaku dispute is as diverse as it is
inconclusive. Central to existing analyses of the conflict, economics have a disputed role
in the creation of a more cooperative relationship between China and Japan. Establishing
a sound argument for the directional relationship between economic growth and security
cooperation will be key for this report. Particularly in light of non-intuitive political
pressures, like Fravel’s example of international cooperation amidst domestic security
crackdowns, political systems demand further scrutiny. The Chinese political system will
require in-depth investigation, as general theories and patterns of Western European
interaction do not appear to hold for the PRC. As multiple sources point to nationalism
being a fostered resource in the PRC, we will eventually consider unforeseen externalities
of stoking popular nationalism. First, though, we will discuss the escalating history of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, to provide a context for our in-depth thematic discussions.
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CHAPTER IV
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
This study first considers the competing claims of territory and sovereignty of the
Senkaku Island chain. As an uninhabited and inhospitable series of islets, the Senkakus
have been inconsequential for most of their history. A small Japanese fish processing
plant was established on the main island, Uotsuri Jima, in the early 1900s. By 1940, that
business had failed, leaving the chain uninhabited and obscure other than for purposes of
navigation on the East China Sea.52
Sino-Japanese War
In international relations, the islands also enjoyed relative obscurity until the
discovery of energy resources after World War II. As a result of the Sino-Japanese War,
China was forced to assent in 1895 to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, one of many Unequal
Treaties signed by the late Qing Dynasty which ceded territory to foreign powers.53 This
paved the way for Japanese industrialization of the isles around 1900, where the islands
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were licensed for development to a private owner, which established the status quo that
continued after the surrender of Imperial Japan in 1945. The original private owners sold
their title to the Kurihara family, whose descendants would ultimately sell their stake to
the Japanese central government in 2012.54

Figure 1. Map of East China Sea.55
Disagreements over the fate of the islets grew out of a rapid-fire string of events
following the American reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1970. Contemporaneously, oil
and natural gas prospectors discovered ample resources in the disputed zone between
China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. The discovery focused on the continental shelf, where
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oil developments are technically and economically advantageous. See Figure 1 for a
geographic illustration of the Chunxiao Gas Field with respect to the Senkaku islands.
The extent of the development was underlined by the United Nations team responsible
for the find:
A geological survey, conducted by the Committee for Coordination of Joint
Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(UNECAFE), suggested that ‘a high probability exists that the continental shelf
between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the
world, with potential estimated at between 10 to 100 billion barrels’56
With this discovery, a flurry of activity surrounded the islets as nations vied to use them
as an anchor to enhance oceanic territorial claims. The mainland Chinese lodged
complaints with the United States, followed by bitter recriminations over the repatriation
of Okinawa. As Okinawa is part of the same island chain, the Ryukyus, the Senkaku
islands were drawn into the debate. Japan and the United States struck a conciliatory
tone, delaying the repatriation of the whole series of islands for a year and avoiding
unilateral oil development in the region.57 This highlights the role of the United States as
an officially neutral arbiter of the dispute, although as is evident in ubiquitous official
media pronouncements, the United States is increasingly seen by the Chinese Communist
Party as an ally of the Japanese.
The Fishing Expedition
The dispute was shelved as part of a strategy by the Japanese and Chinese to use
economic development as a common cause to avoid conflict. It did not remain out of the
limelight for long: the issue resurfaced in 1978 in a series of events known as The Fishing
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Expedition. To fully understand this flare-up of the history of the Senkaku Islets, the
observer must consider the radical changes occurring in the regional balance of power at
the time.
The People’s Republic of China and Japan had a long and tenuous road to
normalized political relations after the Second World War. In particular, the Chinese
Communist Party resisted efforts to integrate into the wider international political order.
The first step to more regular interaction was the Joint Communiqué of the Government
of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China in 1972, which was
followed by the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978. The Joint Communiqué took the
nations out of their estranged state, while the PFT sought to resolve difficult issues
preventing further economic integration and Soviet deterrence.58
The Peace and Friendship Treaty held alternate promises for the two negotiating
parties. For the Chinese, the “anti-hegemony clause” was the most important concession,
creating a unified front between Japan and the PRC in the event of hostilities with the
Soviet Union. This diplomatic focus highlights the sometimes-neglected conflict and
paranoia surrounding China’s relationship with the Soviets. The Japanese negotiators,
and in particular the conservative wing of the singular Liberal Democratic Party, resisted
the possibility of political alliance with the Chinese. For their part, the Japanese
negotiators saw the PFT as an avenue for decreased animosity and increased trade.59 In
particular, the Keidanren, or Federation of Economic Organizations, encouraged the
Japanese government to negotiate for greater trade ties: the Chinese mainland held the
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energy resources that had long constrained Japan’s economic growth, as well as the
eventual promise of a massive market for the industrial goods Japan produced.60
As a poison pill, negotiators from the conservative faction of the LDP attempted
to water down the anti-hegemony clause. Both sides took a keen interest in the exact
phrasing of the treaty, with Japanese negotiators opting for a less enforceable document.61
Profoundly sensitive, the issue effectively stalled negotiations. This was a subtle and
peaceful rebuke, which characterizes conservative Japanese resistance over cooperation
on the island issue. As the negotiations foundered, a contiguous series of events unfolded,
assisting in the creation of another sovereignty flare-up.
In 1976, Mao Zedong died of natural causes in the Zhongnanhai Party Compound
in Beijing. This touched off a series of tumultuous power-grabs among the Communist
Party’s ruling cliques, as no formal structure existed for peaceful power transition. A
brutal sequence of coups and countercoups isolated and destroyed the obvious heir
apparent of Mao’s rule.62 The leftist faction, inheritors of Mao’s doctrine of mass
mobilization and “continuous revolution,” were led by the fractious Gang of Four,
including Mao’s surviving wife Jiang Qing. The conservative faction within the Chinese
Communist Party, bolstered by the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and surviving the
subsequent violent purges of the Cultural Revolution, opposed the doctrine of continuing
tumult. The conservatives won out in a series of power plays, led by Deng Xiaoping and
Hua Guofeng, while their position was enhanced by the increasingly undeniable signs of
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massive famine in the countryside as a result of governmental neglect and intentional
denial of support.63
The resulting international arena was fraught with peril for the prospects of
delicate negotiations. Illustrating the balance between internal hegemony and external
aggression in mainland China, Deng Xiaoping ordered a fleet of more than 100 fishing
trawlers to siege the Senkaku Islets whilst draped in oversized Chinese national flags.
The resulting diplomatic firestorm affirmatively sank the stalled negotiations over the
islets. The series of events shows that Deng Xiaoping, as with future Chinese leaders,
uses unilateral aggressive actions to neutralize resistance to party hegemony within the
Chinese mainland. The demonstration was followed by a rare display of Japanese
parliamentary consensus to denounce China. Further, Japanese ultranationalist groups
sailed for the islands to establish a lighthouse, which would become a recurring
flashpoint for international escalation over the islands.
After months of crisis, the dispute was again shelved by mutual agreement
between China and Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo announced that his
government was returning to the PFT negotiating table after abruptly departing the
process at the start of the crisis. Deng Xiaoping, after an extended period of nationalist
fervor allowed him to consolidate power, removed the Chinese fleet from the disputed
waters. By using People’s Liberation Army Navy commanders on the involved fishing
trawlers, China brought a dangerous military element to the gamesmanship around the
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islets.64 The fact that the fishing trawlers were armed with heavy weapons, ostensibly to
prevent the Japanese coast guard from interfering, also raised the level of risk.65 Notably,
Japan considered and perennially rejected using military vessels to protect its islet
administration, weighing de-escalation and remaining militarily unprovocative as more
important than the risk to their claimed territorial sovereignty.
The so-called fishing expedition and the Peace and Friendship Treaty from which
it stemmed offer an early example of the two nations’ conflict management styles. There
is uncertainty over the official nature of the fishermen’s protest, since during the final,
successful phase of treaty negotiations Deng Xiaoping claimed that the fishermen had
only swayed off course by accident.66 Whether or not this denial is credible or just a
means of saving face, there is no uncertainty about Chinese policy after the protest began.
The Chinese Communist Party denounced Japanese diplomatic overtures for intervention,
citing unilateral ownership of the islets. This highly aggressive, diplomatically irregular
negotiating style serves two purposes: the first is that it allows the Chinese to probe the
solidity of Japanese negotiating positions. The second is that it allows the ruling clique to
invoke an intense foreign entanglement as cover to subdue domestic opposition.
The First Lighthouse Incident
The issue was again raised, this time under the initiative of Japanese citizens in
nationalist groups, in a series of events known as the Lighthouse Incident. The previous
establishment of a lighthouse in the late 1970s was followed up by similar ultranationalist
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advocacy groups returning to refurbish the structure. After building the edifice to
Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) standards, the ultranationalists applied for a
permit for the lighthouse to be recognized as a navigation aid in 1989. The government
did not oppose the move in the early stages, which cast the die for a renewed struggle.
Initially, the Chinese response was restrained: complex international maneuvering
was required to limit sanctions after the Tiananmen Square massacre, in which unarmed
protestors were fired on after the declaration of martial law. While the Chinese
government actively obstructs inquiries into the total number of its citizens who were
killed, the official tally stands at 218 civilians. Sources outside the Chinese Communist
Party estimate several thousand civilian deaths in the capital, excluding extrajudicial
killings after the event and deaths due to the denial of medical treatment.67
Ultimately, the issue of the lighthouse was resolved as the Japanese and Chinese
government colluded to shelve the conflict. Japan denied the ultranationalists’ application
for recognition of the lighthouse, and the Chinese did not press. Complex internal power
dynamics limited the Chinese government’s freedom of maneuver- reformers faced the
dual strain of a nascent and faltering liberal economy alongside internal strife. There is a
very real possibility that the Communist Party tempered its reaction to allow trade ties
with Japan to mature.
The Second Lighthouse Incident
Tumultuous economic reforms in China paired with an aggressive foreign posture
ensured that the Senkaku Islets were not uncontested for long. In 1996, the Japanese
67
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ultranationalists returned to Uotsuri to refurbish their lighthouse. The political climate
was exceedingly tense, which led to the resulting flareup being more severe. Chinese
military forces accelerated underground nuclear testing, leading to protests from the
Japanese Diet.68 Further, the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-6 primed the region for further
destabilizing conflict. In response to provocative Chinese military exercises, including
the “testing” of missiles 30 miles off the Taiwanese coast, an American carrier group was
sortied to the Taiwan Straits.
In this environment of severely strained relations, the Second Lighthouse Incident
proceeded in earnest. Seven Japanese activists raised the old ultranationalist lighthouse,
and once again requested government sanction, which was denied. Chinese activist David
Chan, who sailed as part of the Baodiao, or Protect the Diaoyu Movement from Hong
Kong, died in the waters off Senkaku in an altercation with the Japanese Maritime Safety
Agency. While his death was apparently an accident that resulted from rough seas during
his swim to shore, public opinion was enflamed in mainland China, as well as in Taiwan
and expatriate communities in the United States. The recovery of the activist’s body by
the Japanese coast guard was treated with suspicion and hostility in the activist
community. As a result, further activist flotillas sortied from China and Taiwan,
successfully planting various national flags on the Senkaku islets.
The especially fraught environment was recognized by the two principal actors,
Japan and China, who both sought de-escalation. Japanese government officials were
restrained in their response to routine disruptions by Baodiao activists. The application
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for lighthouse recognition was once again denied, although that did little to allay
accusations of ultranationalist sympathies leveled against the Japanese government. The
Chinese Communist Party was alarmed at the strength and furor of nationalist sentiments
on the mainland aroused by the death of David Chan. It quickly denounced him,
suppressed news of his death, and sought to marginalize the nascent activist base growing
within its borders and in expatriate communities abroad.69 This reinforces the tendency of
the Chinese government to consider internal hegemony paramount, even at the expense
of international claims.
2005 Flare-up and the Race for Natural Resources
Highlighting the explosive underpinnings of conflict over the Senkakus since
1972, the next international incident focused on the islets directly acknowledges the
struggle over natural gas and oil exploration. At the core of the issue from inception,
neither party concerned can back away from possession of the islets which would bolster
mineral claims. Japan in particular suffers from resource scarcity, backstopping its
uncompromising position on the islets. The Chinese government, for its part, views the
petrochemical industry as both a source of growth in itself as well as a strategic resource
which underpins all industrial development.
In an ongoing trend, Chinese activists were arrested by Japanese JMSA officials
for violating Japanese law after planting their national flags on the Senkakus in 2004. The
routine request for remediation by the Japanese was rebutted by the mainland Chinese,
who countered with strong condemnation of the detention of Chinese citizens. This
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follows the general pattern of the PRC government repudiating of regular diplomatic
activity during times of crisis. The aftermath illustrates the slowly increasing autonomy
of the Chinese public, given the rise of microblogging and mobile communication
technology in China. This trend of independent organization and civic communication is
a source of deep discomfort for the leadership clique in the Chinese Communist Party.
Anti-Japanese protests followed in major Chinese cities, resulting in damage to the
Japanese embassy in Beijing as well as various Japanese investments in the country. The
violence was indiscriminant, down to the targeting of hapless drivers of Japanese-branded
automobiles manufactured in China.
This political conflict was undergirded by simultaneous resource exploration near
the disputed territories. Chinese resource exploration vessels triggered alerts within the
JMSA, prompting a formal complaint by the Japanese government. These diplomatic
entreaties failed, and China began developing natural gas extraction rigs in 2004. The
Japanese responded in kind, with both parties violating earlier agreements to delay
resource extraction until a settlement is reached.
As with the Lighthouse Incidents, a conflux of factors exacerbated the crisis.
Rapid developments on the islets involved the JMSA taking official ownership of the
ultranationalist lighthouse. A traditional trigger for mainland protests, the lighthouse
issue again ignited Chinese nationalism, with an uncommonly violent string of protests.
In official diplomatic channels, the Chinese rebuffed demands for apology and
compensation over damages inflicted during the riots. As a counterpoint, the Chinese
attributed the unrest to unsatisfactory Japanese apologies over past war crimes. This
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illustrates the unique, Chinese brand of diplomacy, with difficult-to-predict interludes of
ordinary cooperation mixed with strident refutation of diplomatic norms.
To resolve the crisis, the two countries again sidestepped the central conflict. To
answer the call for wartime apologies, Japan agreed to a bilateral study of the Chinese
and Japanese history. This de-escalated the train of events that had so recently provoked
violent outbursts on the mainland. In the East China Sea, the negotiations were more
fraught. After multiple rounds of deal-making were hindered by sovereignty disputes, the
two countries agreed to joint development at 4 natural gas sites in the region. 70 Even this
incremental development would eventually be undone by renewed conflict over the
islets.71
2012 Flare-up and the Nationalization Crisis
The increased economic ties between China and Japan have had limited success in
preventing the two regional powers from tense standoffs. Recent events riff on familiar
motifs in the conflict, but with China increasingly able to project force for a possible
violent challenge to the status quo. The most recent Senkaku controversy stems from a
string of events, once again, fomented by Japanese nationalist groups. Led by the
conservative Mayor of Tokyo prefecture, Ishihara Shintaro, a national fundraising drive
sought to purchase the Senkaku Islets privately from their Japanese owner. The central
government pre-empted the move, nationalizing the islands to prevent further
gamesmanship by the nationalists. The die, however, was cast. The move predictably
infuriated the mainland Chinese.
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In a now-familiar milieu, 85 Chinese cities experienced major anti-Japanese
protests. Thousands of marchers took to the street in a two-week stretch, sometimes using
violence to underscore their displeasure. Both governments closely monitored the
treatment of Japanese citizens and property in China, although the Chinese government
did little to protect the latter. Concurrently, the People’s Liberation Navy sailed a group
of 7 warships through the Miyaku Strait, which separates Okinawa from the
southernmost home island of Honshu. China filed no advanced notice with Japan for
these maneuvers, repudiating a security agreement in what is widely believed to be a
protest over the Senkaku Islets.72
In this uncertain security environment, the United States has transitioned away
from its longstanding neutrality on the Senkaku question. After four decades of delicate
fence-sitting, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed in October 2010 that the
Senkaku Islands would be considered Japanese territory for the purposes of mutual
defense pacts.73 While this leaves the political and economic conflict in question, it does
much to rebalance the possible gains to precipitous military action in the region. This
confirmation follows a long period of official neutrality, apparently as a salve to SinoAmerican relations, although the chilled atmosphere demonstrates that such small
concessions were insufficient to shape Chinese government views.
In recent events, the unilateral establishment of a Chinese air defense zone over
the islets has further exacerbated tensions. Following on the heels of numerous reports of
Chinese military aircraft patrolling overhead, this may be the new pattern for the Senkaku
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dispute. The inclusion of military forces invites a potentially disastrous new avenue of
possibilities, given the Chinese military’s penchant for gamesmanship, such as the
targeting of fire-control radars on American and Japanese naval vessels.74 While the
Japanese and American forces can repudiate unilateral aerial cordons by violating them,
this risks confrontation with a newly emboldened and rearmed China. Given the pattern
of escalation in the Senkaku dispute, it behooves policy-makers to understand what
factors drive ongoing conflict. Hopefully, the multilayered and tangled narrative of the
dispute up to this point has served as a demonstration of the issue’s complexity. To better
understand that complexity, we will consider factors beyond the conflict which explain
its nature and longevity.
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CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
The global economy has experienced radical shifts since World War II. As
globalization pervades the marketplace, industries formerly dominated by the Western
industrial states have opened up. This transformation is critical to understanding the
power dynamics of East Asia, which is at the center of global economic rebalancing. For
this study, we will first consider Japan, an archetype for explosive growth that now sits in
the fraternity of industrialized nations. The desolation of Japan and much of East Asia
during World War II provided a largely blank slate for economic growth, and this human
development does much to provide context for the current tension in the region. We will
then consider Communist China, a late-comer whose meteoric rise is still being
counterbalanced by the global and regional economy. China, a nation with few of the
intrinsic size and resource limitations of the Japanese home islands, has charted an
impressive course of growth through hybrid communist/market policies. Lastly, we will
view trade ties between the two powers and their relationship over energy resources as a
case study for how economic growth and competition effects international cooperation.
Japan: Industry from Ashes
Japanese re-industrialization after the war was perhaps the first economic upset
stemming from globalization in the post-war period. The widely held assumption that
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non-western nations would not compete industrially was challenged through a series of
successful policies enacted during the American75 occupation and subsequent Japanese
administrations. Not widely recognized, this pattern of explosive industrial growth has
precedents in Japan’s interwar years. During the interwar years, also referred to as the
Meiji Restoration, Japan’s industrial output increased by 600 percent. Compare that to the
relatively more advanced but not yet fully developed American market which increased
by only 66 percent.76 This was the result, on the one hand, of effective industrial policies
and a stability-focused government. It was also the result of mercantile conquest, as the
Korean peninsula was aggressively colonized for access to cheap labor and raw materials.
A similar process was undertaken in northern Chinese provinces, with a similar level of
brutality, to the lasting displeasure of both the Chinese and Korean governments.
Immediately after World War II, Japan was physically ruined. The institutions
and human capital that had created the pre-war prosperity, however, were still largely in
place. The United States, after initial indecision on the matter with fears over war
industries, firmly backed Japanese industrial growth. This took the form of a relatively
benevolent occupation, focused on economic and institutional development rather than
war reparations. Accordingly, during the Korean War, Japan benefitted greatly from its
preferred status in filling wartime supply contracts. Most importantly, these policies
involved the opening of American markets to Japanese goods. The political drives toward
this American policy are succinctly described by Chalmers Johnson, an expert on the
Japanese economy:
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The American approach to Japan after the war was to declare that Japan was of
great strategic importance and very little economic importance. It was for this
reason that we allowed Japan to maintain protection of its domestic markets much
longer than any European country, to maintain an undervalued currency much
longer, why we transferred huge amounts of technology to Japan at bargain
basement prices, and also gave Japan virtually unlimited access to the world’s
largest market, namely the American market…77

As a result of strategic considerations stemming from the Cold War, Japan gained
access to practically bottomless export market and a reliable source of raw materials. This
enabled the Japanese government and corporate concerns to pursue a classic pattern of
industrial development, focusing first on low-skill manufactures (principally textiles),
and then leveraging that success into high-skill manufactures (such as automobiles and
electronics). This process was eased by American sponsorship of the Japanese request in
1955 to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), an early predecessor
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was accepted in 1963. Consider that the
Chinese process to join the formal international trading community was much less
successful, with their GATT application being derailed by human rights violations during
the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989.
Several unique characteristics of the Japanese economy aided its successful
transformation. In a nation where policy development is characterized by intensive
bureaucratic involvement, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) stands
among the most powerful bureaucracies. The MITI encouraged wholesale importation of
manufacturing technology, largely on favorable terms from the United States. Certain
reforms sponsored by the Americans, such as the occupation-era anti-monopoly statutes,
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were repealed during the postwar boom. This conglomeration aided in the eventual shift
toward heavy industries, as components and finished products could be manufactured
within one self-sufficient supply chain.
The Japanese economy re-centered itself around several massive, diversified
conglomerates. The structure of these keiretsu, or business communities, forces costly
expenditures onto the smaller subsidiary companies while maintaining the growth of the
vast parent company. This structure was particularly advantageous for the automobile
industry, which serves as a useful example of Japan’s export boom. With a tradition of
heavy manufactures in shipbuilding and military hardware, Japanese industry was well
poised to take over export automobile market shares in a way other emerging economies
were not. Strict limitations of capital movement allowed for Japanese companies to
reestablish themselves with limited foreign investment, and thus profits were available
for domestic reinvestment. Similarly, an intricate network of regulations prevented the
easy importation of foreign manufactures to Japan. For example, each imported
automobile must be manually inspected for defects by customs officers upon arrival.78
As such, while the Japanese economy grew, that was a centralized process, one
which depended on access to foreign markets more than access to foreign investment. In
the early postwar period, Japan benefitted greatly from a lack of regional competitor, as
China was mired in revolutionary violence. This pattern could not last forever, which
Japanese policy recognized in the form of aid to a former military opponent and probable
future economic competitor.
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China: Newcomer and Giant
China followed a very different developmental trajectory after World War II.
Where Japan was fostered by the United States as a bulwark against communism, China
resided on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The United States recognized the Nationalist
government as the legitimate rulers of China after the Chinese Civil War, going so far as
to hold the Taiwan Straits with the US Seventh Fleet to prevent forcible reunification.
The Chinese Communist Party could not even rely on their nominal allies in the USSR,
as deep distrust reigned in that tempestuous relationship. China, underdeveloped before
the war, set about a policy of isolation and self-development that was marred by
revolutionary disorganization. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet system that the
People’s Republic fully embraced market-based economic reforms, hastening industrial
growth and eventually leading to membership in the WTO.
Following the revolutionary tumult of the Great Leap Forward and subsequent
Cultural Revolution, China was faced with a conundrum. Economic development was
sagging, while regional competitors were exhibiting unprecedented growth. Market
reform was initiated in China in 1978, just as Japan was settling into a pattern of
explosive growth. The USSR, while readying the military buildup which would
eventually derail its economy and political system, presented a model for comparatively
successful communist development. For comparison, at the earliest initiation of marketreform in China, the average Chinese citizen made 226 USD$ annually. By contrast, the
average Japanese citizen made 8,675 USD$ annually, or roughly 38 times as much.79
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To address these deficiencies in the Chinese command economy, the CCP
instituted a series of slow-moving reforms to test essentially market-based approaches in
a hybrid system.80 The first of these was agricultural: a centerpiece of the revolutionary
Chinese economy was the communal farm. The farms constituted the primary mode of
organization for China’s vast rural population. In a radical departure, the Chinese
government relaxed their grain procurement quotas while increasing the price allotted for
the compulsory sales to the government. Most importantly, the communes contracted out
parcels of land to individual families, allowing surplus beyond the quota to be sold at
market price. These policies allowed the practical disbanding of communal farms, while
the organizations went on in name for several more years. Finance for the rebalanced
grain prices was procured by limiting other programs, notably the “Great Leap Outward,”
which was an ambitious plan for industrial modernization through the purchase and
importation of Western technology.81
Market-based incentives were integrated piecemeal into the Chinese system,
coming to a head in the 1980s. After initial success in agriculture, commercial
manufacturing was addressed in two waves. The first wave, indicative of Chinese policy
making in general, was undertaken cautiously over a period of years. Under the
premiership of Deng Xiaoping, party leader Zhao Ziyang embarked on a mission of nondisruptive reforms. Special care was taken to shield the workers in state-owned
enterprises (SOE), which led the changes to be collectively known as reform without
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losers.82 Competition was injected into the moribund Chinese industrial economy through
a series of reforms to encourage low-level industrial growth. Tax rates were negotiated
with individual corporations with the goal of fostering new entrants under the
particularistic contract system. This system of individually negotiated tax rates gave the
government extraordinary control over industrial development.
The most important instrument used to usher in the second wave of market
reforms was the shuangguizhi, or dual-track system. In the same model as earlier reforms
to the communal farms, industries were given a command quota at a set price, typically
below market value. They were then allowed to sell a surplus in excess of that quota at
market price. The transformative effect this had on the Chinese economy cannot be
overstated. Industrial production surged across a broad spectrum of markets, kicking off
two decades of rapid economic growth for China. The shuanggui system was used to
slowly transition the Chinese command economy to market incentives, picking up speed
in the 1990s. For instance, the particularistic contracts which were used in early reforms
were phased out over a number of years, replaced by a uniform tax code. The function of
the old contract system had been replaced and streamlined by the new quota system, with
a net benefit toward suffering government revenues.83 See Figure 2 for an illustration of
the success of these reforms.
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Figure 2. PRC Budgetary Revenue Responds to Reform.84
This is not to suggest that the dual-track system created a painless transition. The
second wave of market reforms was characterized by substantial downsizing in SOE
employment. Consider Figure 3 for SOE employment statistics over the course of the
reforms. Public employment, known during the revolutionary period as “the iron
ricebowl” due to its guarantee of a minimum standard of living, lost much of its social
cache and stability. The second wave of reforms, administered by the charismatic Zhu
Rongji, introduced privatization as a means of increasing market competition. The effect
was twofold: first, the economy surged, fueled by newly confident international investors.
Second, Chinese workers suffered from a greater degree of personal insecurity, with the
social safety net lagging behind in filling the gaps.85 This suggests a weakness in the
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liberal interpretation of economic growth as a pacifying force: in China, spectacular
macroeconomic growth coincides with increased personal insecurity due to pollution and
inadequate social safeguards.

Figure 3. SOE Employment with Estimated Data.86
Of particular importance to Chinese decision making in international affairs,
China has become heavily reliant on foreign direct investment as a means of financing its
development. This intervention is characterized in a number of ways. Compared to other
developing nations, China’s foreign investment is massive. FDI peaked at six percent of
GDP in 1994, compared to one to two percent for periods of comparable economic
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expansion in South Korea or Japan.87 Investment is disproportionately represented in the
manufacturing sector, with a special focus on export manufacturing. For instance, 88
percent of China’s high technology export firms are heavily foreign invested.88 This
process was encouraged in a number of ways by Chinese government policy, of which
special economic zones were a centerpiece.
Special economic zones (SEZs) were created, at first cautiously, to lure foreign
manufacturing concerns to the mainland. The success of early zones, such as Shenzhen in
Guangdong province, led to the rapid expansion of existing zones and the creation of new
areas of free trade. The mechanisms of the SEZs essentially carved out an economically
autonomous zone from the home country. Import and export duties on raw materials were
waived. Administrative procedures were simplified, with a variety of permitting
processes being handled through a single, central office. Taxes were administered in a
preferential scheme, with a full tax holiday for a negotiated number of years, followed by
a gradual introduction of the regular rate.89 This host of preferential conditions, combined
with China’s political stability compared to its developmental peers, proved to be a strong
lure for foreign investment.
The format for SEZs again highlights the cautious nature of Chinese economic
policymaking. In a system analogous to the shuangguizhi but applied to foreign
investment, a dual-track system was created. The special zones were laboratories for
experimental economic policies, segregated from the bulk of the Chinese economy.90 The
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predecessor to the SEZ system, the export processing system, operated under a similar
design. Foreign raw materials were transferred to Chinese factories, processed, and then
returned to the foreign company for sale after a processing fee was paid. At no point were
domestic markets or companies challenged. The SEZ system, with its export focus,
provides a scaled-up version of this domestic market protection amid foreign trade
engagement. The system allowed China to slowly introduce foreign competition, largely
to meet conditions of World Trade Organization membership, after domestic industries
had an opportunity to increase their competitiveness on foreign markets.
Encouraging direct foreign investments into China’s manufacturing capabilities
had multiple benefits for the economy. Technology development programs, initiated in
the 1980s and recently covered in the international press for corruption, failed to provide
China with the manufacturing capital to compete with foreign businesses. As such, an
inviting program for FDI allowed foreign businesses to lend their manufacturing
technologies directly to Chinese subsidiaries in the SEZs. The foreign importation of
technology has vastly outstripped the Chinese domestic capacity to develop its own
advancements since the market opening of 1993.91 This transfer of economic capital does
not solely consist of machinery. Multinational corporations (MNCs) also invest in
Chinese citizens’ managerial capabilities, offering local employees exposure to efficient
business practices. While the benefits of market investment are numerous for the Chinese
economy, they also present a threat to the Communist Party leadership.
Central to Chinese economic planning is the idea of self-sufficiency. The Century
of Humiliation, from the start of the Opium War in 1839 to the end of the Pacific War in
91
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1945, was characterized by foreign domination of the military and economic spheres of
China. This historical legacy impacts the Chinese public and policymakers in a way that
more recent, suppressed events cannot. While China’s growth has been spectacular, it
also raises troublesome linkages to the world system which limits China’s ability to
maneuver. A particular sore spot is the creeping domination of Manchurian markets
which Japan instituted prior to their invasion in 1937. This leads the Chinese government
to institute barriers to balance foreign investment and domestic control. Despite largely
successful efforts to control foreign influence through tight government control of the
terms of investment, the Chinese policy is undermined by its own success.

Figure 4. Main Sources of FDI to China.92
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As opposed to utilizing stock investment or international bank loans, China has
financed much of its development through FDI. Consider Figure 4 for a regional breakdown of FDI sources, with a particular eye on the investment of overseas Chinese
governments and SARs. While this is avoids the meddling investor control of stock and
the debt burden of development loans, it does rely on continuous foreign investor
confidence. This confidence is reliant on China’s stability, which is in turn linked to
China refraining from aggressive actions on its myriad territorial disputes. Taiwan, the
largest disputed territory and among the largest of investors in the mainland, occupies a
peculiar spot in PRC foreign relations. Taiwanese business cooperation with the PRC
coincides with periodic threats to Taiwanese sovereignty, such as the missile launches at
the heart of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996. This illustrates the murky balance struck
when using economic development to stave off foreign aggression. Still, it bears
repeating that full-scale conflict has been successfully avoided.
While the Senkaku Islets have enflamed public and government sentiments on
multiple occasions, none has escalated into armed conflict. This is in part due to the
Chinese economy’s integral linkages to the world economy. That is not to say that
economic cooperation creates perfect international citizens: China’s recent institution of
an air-defense cordon over the Senkaku Islets recalls similarly aggressive tactics during
the Taiwan Straits Crisis and other disputes, but the conflict was successfully deescalated by all parties involved.
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Economic Interdependence
Given the toxic diplomatic history between China and Japan stretching to conflict
over the Korean Peninsula in 663CE, the two nations make a curious trading dyad. At the
same time, robust trade between China and Japan, even during periods of intense
international tension, highlights the political indifference of market cooperation. Policies
which back this pattern of trade being separate from international disputes are known by
several names, including seikei bunri in Japan, or the separation of politics and
economics.
Trade with China followed in several phases for the Japanese. In spite of the
devastating and acrimonious experience of World War II, trade resumed on a small scale
between the two nations in the immediate aftermath. By the 1950s and 1960s, minor
private firms were engaged in bilateral trade on the per-case approval of the Chinese
government. The political opening of the 1970s, culminating in the normalization of
relations and the Peace and Friendship Treaty, expanded this early market cooperation.
The 1980s saw the groundwork for a vastly improved trade partnership, in line with other
proximal large economies. This framework blossomed into robust trading with China’s
emergence in the world economy in the 1990s and 2000s.93
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Figure 5. Total PRC Imports and Exports as Percent of GDP.94
In the past 30 years, China has experienced a transformation from an insular,
largely agricultural economy to a globally interconnected industrial economy. This rapid
reconfiguration is evidenced in Figure 5, as reflected in the export and import values as a
share of the GDP. It bears repeating that the Chinese GDP also spiked over the same
period, driven by many of the same factors, meaning that the illustrated trend is likely
understated. While China is broadly dependent on international trade, with a huge and
increasing portion of the national GDP developed through trade, it is also specifically
wedded to trade with the Japanese in particular. The Chinese economy presently
manufactures or assembles lower technology products for eventual sale by foreign
companies abroad. As Japan is at the tail-end of industrial development, this arrangement
is particularly beneficial as a way of reducing labor costs, which are prohibitive in the
home islands. Consider the same trade statistics when charted between China and Japan
over time.
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Figure 6. China's Balance of T
Trade with Japan.95
While Japan maintains a slight advantage in terms of total values of trade balance, the
broader narrative is one of mutual benefit and growt
growth.
When taken in the context of civil unrest and political boycotting, such as
occurred in the 2012-2013
2013 Senkaku crisis, the question of trade balance becomes
important to policy formation. To understand the impetus behind state
state-run
run Chinese media
sources encouraging a boycott of Japanese manufactures, an observer must understand
the two countries relative dependence on one another. For instance, China might be
taking an aggressive stance, ostensibly using its newfound trading might to force
neighbors into concessions
concessions.. Alternatively, China might be taking a defensive stance,
using popular unrest as a plausibly deniable tool to protect domestic markets and reduce
worrisome foreign trade dependence. Evidence more closely aligns with this latter
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possibility. This
is explanation is particularly convincing when viewed in a regime
insecurity mindset, as minor reductions in total trade are not considered dangerous to
home rule while foreign interference categorically is. Consider Figure 7 for a calculation
of relative trade dependencies up to 2006.
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Figure 7. Trade Dependency bbetween Japan and China.96
Trade dependency, a quotient created by Katherine Barbieri, measures the balance
of trade against the size of the economy at large.97 Specifically, the calculation is
formulated as a function of imports between two countries added to exports between two
countries, all of which are divided by the gross domestic product of the country of
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analysis. Calculating trade dependency between Japan and China renders interesting
results. Contrary to the popular narrative of an economically ascendant China dominating
an industrially moribund Japan, Japan has a more broadly balanced trade portfolio, and as
such is insulated from shocks caused by Chinese governmental interference. When taken
in conjunction with the Japanese business community’s deep discomfort over recent
violence on the mainland, this set of economic realities shows protests and boycotts to be
counterproductive in forcing changes to Japanese island policy. If anything, further
boycotting will reduce Japanese investment in the mainland without deep effect to the
Japanese economy, an economically adverse proposal, but one which the central
Communist leadership may be comfortable with for reasons related to domestic
sovereignty. This is in keeping with the theory of regime insecurity, whereby economic
success leads a regime to value internal hegemony over international cooperation when
the two are at odds. The value of the overall trade, however, does appear to soften
Chinese demands, as over the several decade dispute China has made no concrete effort
to seize the islands by force.
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CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL CONTEXT
Economic data is indicative of a nation’s means, including its ability to influence
or overpower its neighbors. While the economic trends of China’s opening and Japan’s
relative decline describe a system vulnerable to upset, these trends are nothing if not
acted upon. For this reason, it is important to view the economies (and the capabilities
they allow) in the context of political systems. These systems will shape the actions that
the concerned parties take, informed by historical recollections and economic realities.
The end of the Cold War is a vital point of reference for understanding Chinese
and Japanese governance, as the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a period of frenetic
rebalancing by both powers. In Japan, the democratic system of governance that had
fostered unparalleled growth in the postwar system was reformed. Clientelism was
reduced, and the system was made more responsive to public opinion. All of this was
done while carefully minding postwar taboos like military expansion, if not entirely
foreclosing the possibility of tough stances on China and North Korea. These reforms
were undertaken in the hopes of revitalizing the Japanese economy to ready it for the
increase in Japan’s aging population, which is itself the product of a highly successful
social safety net.
China’s experience since the end of the Cold War is very different. Initial
uneasiness over the imbalance of global power in favor of the United States (and by
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association, the suspect Japanese) dictated early policy adjustments. Revolutionary China
was characterized by abrupt and confrontational foreign policy; after the Tiananmen
Square Massacre, the Communist leadership clique offered a different and subdued
international response, if only to preserve the early fruits of market reform and ensure
safe entrance into the WTO. Despite a conciliatory international posture, domestic
violence ensured that the Chinese citizenry was clearly warned of the extents their
government would go through to ensure ongoing Communist Party rule. China’s relative
vulnerability, however, has decreased. This transition amid massive economic growth has
led to a resurgence of an aggressive, assertive China. Popular discontent, while still
viciously suppressed in the domestic sphere, is encouraged when aimed outward.
Japanese Politics
Japan today is a highly functional, liberal democracy. Citizens consistently rank
their nation as among the most successful in rooting out corruption, on par with the most
economically advanced OECD countries.98 Perhaps the most fundamental question facing
the Japanese government in the domestic sphere is how to stoke economic development.
Vast ideological differences evinced by some representative systems (i.e., the United
States) are largely absent in Japanese domestic politics. Vocal minorities, such as the
ultranationalist fringe, comprise an important exception to the broad trend. This system is
shifting towards a more partisan configuration as a result of the electoral reforms of 1993,
but the process has thus far created only moderate, incremental change.
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Japanese politics through the early 1990s were characterized by one-party rule
with countless vying factions. The monolithic Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
dominated, and a system of clientelism was the determining factor in elections. The
election structure, with a peculiar mix of proportional representation, awarded Diet seats
to the top three to five candidates in district-wide elections. As a result, policy platforms
need not be a broad-based appeal to a majority of voters. Elections were then fought in
terms of a candidate’s ability to attract pork-barrel projects to the district.99 Thus, largescale ideological issues and their attendant historical sensitivities could be avoided in
typical political exchanges.
The reforms of 1993 introduced several new elements to the system. Hybridizing
the existing system, a majority of Dietmen would be elected by first-past-the-post voting
in single-member districts. This system, similar to the electoral system of the United
States, put candidates under similar pressures to achieve district-wide appeal. A large
minority of Dietmen were then elected by proportional voting, which assigned seats to
political parties based on overall vote shares. The proportional mechanism, akin to many
European parliamentary systems, encouraged increased party unity and discouraged sharp
factional divides within parties.
The new electoral system was championed by LDP parliamentarians as a means
of shoring up party support. At the time, the LDP was the largest and most stable party,
while their opponents tended to be short-lived coalitions of LDP defectors. The
heightened electoral competition forced parties to create partisan policy platforms, while
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prior to the reforms candidates ran on individual client connections.100 While the LDP
was able to hang on for a number of election cycles, the reforms they pursued ultimately
ended their half-century of dominance as durable opposition parties were formed.
Given the new electoral rules, the impetus for forming strong and resilient
political parties was renewed. Single-seat districts logically dictated that each party run
only one candidate, whereas previously they had run several. While this aided the LDP
by decreasing factionalism within the party, it also encouraged opposition parties to band
together to increase their chances of success. As a result, opposition slowly coalesced
into the Democratic Party of Japan.101 Eventually, the DPJ would outmaneuver and end
the LDP dominance in the new system. This result was confirmed by the 2009 election,
which marked a substantial and likely irreversible change in Japanese political life. For
the first time since its inception, the Diet transferred majority rule to an opposition party.
Japanese Political Parties and Factions
Japan has seen a resurgence of conservative thinking amidst the stressors of a
flagging economy, an increasingly tense regional atmosphere, and a revamped electoral
system. This fact has been widely reported on in the international media, which is acutely
interested in possible regional flashpoints such as the Senkaku Islets, the Spratly Islands,
or the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). It is important, however, to keep these trends
in context: while conservatives have headed government, notably under Abe Shinzo and
Koizumi Ichiro, the changes they have implemented have been evolutionary in nature and
will likely remain so.
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Parallel developments have enabled conservative politicians to reach high office.
Electoral reforms, designed to foster increased political responsiveness and reduce the
draw of clientelist behavior, have caused a shift towards a more personally charismatic
leadership. While Japanese politics are still based on reaching consensus, that consensus
is increasingly negotiated between elected officials and the public rather than elected
officials and the powerful bureaucracies. Public opinion, in turn, is swayed by an unstable
regional balance, particularly given the region’s frequent anti-Japanese outbursts. While
China and North Korea pursue these policies most vigorously, South Korea and Taiwan
have rounded out the group of countries that have recently denounced Japan on symbolic
issues. This hostile environment gives moderate conservatives a more compelling
platform to attract voters.
Starting the trend of conservative high leadership, Prime Minister Koizumi
ascended to office in 2001. His ascent relied on politics by consensus, in particular
drawing on a cadre of supporters from the reformist faction of the LDP. As in previous
administrations, the Japanese public remained overwhelmingly concerned with domestic
issues, namely economic growth and the pension system. The Koizumi administration
devoted substantial amounts of political capital to addressing economic reforms.
Frequently, this resulted in weakening the LDP’s electoral capabilities by reducing
patronage opportunities, which paved the way for the DPJ overtaking the Japanese Diet
in 2009. However, Koizumi’s most substantial legacy was his response to earlier
electoral reforms. The Prime Minister articulated a foreign policy separated from the
bureaucrats, namely Japan’s career diplomatic corps.
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The Prime Minister moved to inject substantial foreign policy debate into the
public dialogue. While foreign issues were not of overbearing importance to the Japanese
electorate, the electoral transition enabled a more responsive debate on policy issues. This
was not necessarily to Koizumi’s electoral benefit: the largest issues during his
administration were the deployment of Japanese military units to non-combat roles in
Iraq and official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. On neither of these issues was the Prime
Minister’s position popular. Koizumi’s “magic,” or his ability to convince the Japanese
people to back otherwise unpopular maneuvers, failed to win overwhelming support for
his controversial foreign affairs program. The Iraq operation concluded after two years of
light casualties and intense public scrutiny, while the issue of official Yasukuni visits
continues to divide the Japanese electorate.102 Just the same, he established the pattern for
his successor to propose assertive and publicly debated foreign policy.
Abe Shinzo, the current Prime Minister of Japan in his second term, built on
Koizumi’s pattern of charismatic, conservative governance. His first term, however,
lasted less than a year and ended with his party coalition in disarray. Prime Minister Abe
started with high public support for his domestic, reformist agenda, seen as a continuation
of Prime Minister Koizumi’s LDP-based reform. However, Abe has connections to
strongly contested movements within the LDP, such as earlier pushes for revision of
official apologies over wartime crimes, such as the sexual abuse of Koreans during the
long occupation. Additionally, Abe continued with his predecessor’s stance towards
Yasukuni visitations, seen as beyond the purview of foreign condemnation.
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While domestic issues are still central to the Japanese voting public, international
issues have recently figured more prominently into the electoral calculus. The crisis pitch
in Sino-Japanese relations at the time of Abe’s first election promoted this, pivoting on
the 2006 flare-up of the Senkaku dispute, with widespread rioting that seemed to be
condoned by the Chinese Communist government. Acceptance of the need for public
policy debate and assertive leadership, however, should not be conflated with a broad
shift towards conservatism in the Japanese electorate.
The voting public, as reported in exit polling, was indifferent to Abe’s push for
constitutional reform. Repeal of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, the Peace Clause,
is a consistent and elusive goal for Japanese conservatives. Even in the face of external
threats, the Japanese public does not support the repeal of this central post-war feature of
Japanese democracy. Consider the following survey statistics reported by Asahi
Shimbun—56 percent of Japanese citizens polled oppose “exercising the right to
collective self-defense,” with 28 percent in favor.103 Exit polling indicated that Abe was
not aided by his conservative foreign policy, but mainly that he was undone by his
controversial economic reforms in the domestic sphere.104 The negative effects of these
neoliberal policies were widely felt, and Abe-nomics can be seen as central in the Abe
government’s quick collapse.
In short, Japan has been democratically addressing a new phase of challenges
since the end of the Cold War. The central theme to these challenges is the reform of the
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post-war system of governance, one which provided unprecedented prosperity but which
has now faltered. Points of international contention, like the Senkaku islets, threaten to
mark this reform process with increased militarism and balkanization. Certainly, elements
of Japanese political leadership back the first steps toward a so-called normalized
national security structure, including a standing army that can legally operate abroad. The
near-total lack of success amongst conservative pushes for a more militant Japan
underscores the country’s political aversion to violence after the Pacific War. In changing
the Japanese system, politicians and the public find a balance in utilizing and tweaking
political forms from the tremendously successful post-war period, rather than harkening
back to the country’s disastrous imperial experience.
Chinese Politics
China today is an economically vibrant authoritarian regime. Economic success
has in some ways moderated the most extreme abuses of the Communist Party, such as in
the recent demobilization of forced labor camps for political and religious dissidents.105
Broad political trends within the Communist Party recognize the futility of revolutionary
governance and build off the pattern of economic development espoused by Deng
Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji. That being said, the nation is still defined by tight Party
control over day-to-day life, from policing ordinary speech to pervasive internet
monitoring. Invasive public health policies, such as the ongoing One Child Policy, insert
an oppressive government into everyday life. State-media coverage works in lockstep
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with the leadership apparatus, a situation which leads to great difficulties in
differentiating Chinese public opinion from Communist Party opinion.
Understanding the information environment in the People’s Republic is key to
understanding the long-term rule of the Communist Party. Chinese media is tightly
circumscribed, with severe punishments and ostracization irregularly inflicted on
dissident authors and editors. The result of this system is often referred to as “selfcensorship” by professional journalists, although the government also engages in direct
censorship, particularly in digital media outlets. An illustrative case of PRC media
regulation is that of the Southern Metropolis Daily, a newspaper which adapted
aggressively to the relative openness after the fall of the Soviet Bloc. The paper was able
to subvert weak party controls at the provincial level, and experienced popular success as
a more-open news outlet.106 In particular, the newspaper used its editorial latitude to
address endemic and unpopular corruption, tapping into popular anger on the issue. This
balance worked, avoiding the retribution of the provincial Propaganda Department, but
only for a time. When the paper touched on more systemic grievances against Communist
Party rule, such as the detainment of those without internal travel documents or the
cover-up of the SARS outbreak in the late 1990s, the Party moved in. Senior editors were
arrested en masse, with several facing hefty prison sentences.107 Thus, with the extent of
governmental tolerance of criticism unclear, the system requires journalists to “selfcensor” to avoid significant punishments.
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Online, the system is more direct due to the advanced technical capabilities of the
Chinese government. Popular global social networking and search pages, such as Twitter
or Google, are blocked by sophisticated firewalls. Firewall enforced bans followed the
rejection of governmental requests for access of user information, data which could allow
Chinese authorities to track service users and enforce information blackouts. Equivalent
services based out of the PRC, such as Sina Weibo or Baidu, accede to governmental
demands for information. The government also has a nuanced command of web access
within sites, both those based out of the PRC and abroad. For instance, Chinese web
censors leave access to foreign media outlets intact, while blocking specific articles that
reference phrases sensitive to the Communist Party.108 With this combination of
capabilities, the government has an unprecedented reach into its citizens’ life of the mind.
Bear these systemic peculiarities in mind during our subsequent discussion of media in
shaping Chinese public opinion.
For China, economic reform and political repression stem from the same root
motivation: the security of the Chinese Communist Party. The end of the Cold War
heralded a period of great uncertainty for China, as activists pressed for increased
political autonomy internally while the Soviet Bloc collapsed. The USSR was a rival, but
also a counterbalance to other rivals, namely the United States and Japan. During this
period of internal vulnerability, external disputes such as the Senkaku Islets were handled
gingerly. For instance, the 1996 flare-up of the crisis followed on the heels of the
Tiananmen crackdown. This event, discussed prior as the Second Lighthouse Incident,
was tightly moderated by the Chinese authorities. In part due to international conditions
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and in part due to the ringleaders being from then-independent Hong Kong, the mainland
suppressed news of the crisis and effectively blocked public protests. This highlights the
balance between domestic and international policy in how the Chinese Communist Party
views its legitimacy. In the event of domestic challenges, China responds more
moderately in its international disputes.
As discussed prior, China has charted an impressive course of economic growth
since the end of the Cold War. This growth has radically altered the balance of power in
the region. It has also led to expectations for domestic reform that have been met with
only tepid Party response. While economic success has provided an increased sense of
legitimacy for Communist Party, it also highlights bankruptcies in the system.
Particularly given that economic success stems from adopting a market economy, the
ideological basis for rule is weak. The ubiquitous security apparatus, headed by the
Ministry of Public Security, possesses the mechanisms to suppress dissent. For the
general public, the Party has access to local and secret prisons, with a pliably politicized
judiciary to expedite targeting government opponents. Within the Party, special
investigators under the auspices of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
pursue suspected corruption and heterodoxy, sometimes using brutal techniques.109
However, the cost of utilizing these controls is periodically high, as evidenced by the
Tiananmen Massacre and the international furor that it occasioned, as well as the
countless smaller scandals since. As such, the Chinese leadership clique needs more tools
to enhance control than economic prosperity and an intrusive security apparatus.
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Not all tools of party control are openly coercive. The Chinese Communist Party
directs vast resources, given the politicization of typically independent industries.
Employment in the professoriate, media, and state-owned businesses (as well as key
positions in select nominally private enterprises) is determined by the Central
Organization Department. The party apparatus maintains control of these avenues of
employment, and all advancement within the party, through a largely secret personnel
system.110 Intense secrecy imbues the system with a number of peculiarities. As the
system is opaque to outside observation, prospective dissenters are uncertain of the
political boundaries that cannot be pushed before access to employment is revoked.
Given that anecdotes abound of students being assigned to the far-flung provinces as
retaliation against infractions, the repressive effect of central control of employment is
considerable.111 Self-censorship, then, is the rational response of ambitious career
candidates.
Like other remnants of revolutionary rule, the Organization Department’s control
over the livelihoods of millions of mainland Chinese exists in ideological limbo since the
market opening. With the recession of Marxist ideology, the secrecy of the Organization
Department has allowed influence peddling. The Politburo, the apex of political power,
has taken keen interest in retaining secret control of top appointees through the
department. This authority is critical to advancing the careers of supporters and relatives
who form the factions to support high officials against ouster. Leaving these mechanisms
in place for rank-and-file officials has created an opening for corruption on a vast scale.
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An illuminating example, which escaped censorship as the scam was not officially
endorsed, highlights the vulnerabilities of the system.
In Sichuan in 2007, when a man passing himself off as an organization
department official secured a payment of $63,000 from a local bureaucrat under
the guise of finding him a senior government post. ‘While they jeered at the
miserable unlucky bureaucrat who paid the bribe,’ the local media reported,
‘people were astonished by the influence of the department over Chinese
officials.’112

This sort of corruption eats away at public confidence. In combination with the
sometimes capricious assignment of jobs under a veil of secrecy, the department wields
power at the cost of general resentment.
Territorial disputes serve a dual-purpose for the ruling elite of China. On the one
hand, China can expand its resource base and international prestige by imposing its will
on neighbor states. Particularly in the case of Japan, success would bring great internal
legitimacy, given the linkage of the Senkaku Islets to earlier aggression in Chinese
accounts. Of course, even an unrelated coup against the Japanese would likely be met
with widespread popular approval, given both the enormity of imperial Japanese
aggression on the continent as well the Chinese government’s focus on those crimes
since. On the other hand, internal challenges to power are a cause of great concern to
Chinese authorities. Populist appeals to xenophobia are balanced with more direct
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measures of control. This is evidenced by the growth of an unprecedented security
apparatus within China, including novel forms such as extensive digital monitoring.113
Without a suitable motivation, China’s response to the most recent set of Senkaku
crises is illogical. China has successful, if heavy-handed, mechanisms to control popular
protests. This is demonstrated annually at the anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown,
with an increase in broad spectrum monitoring and even preemptive incarceration of
prominent dissenters.114 When seen as politically advantageous, as in the 1996 flare-up of
the Senkaku crisis, the government has the means to control even the uncommonly high
popular anger over the disputed islets. In that case, however, the intervention was staged
to prevent the lionization of an outsider from Hong Kong, which could have negative
impacts on Communist Party legitimacy. This is a lesson well learned, as the Communist
Party rose in prominence against the Chinese Nationalists by offering a more convincing
rebuff to the Imperial Japanese occupation. In most cases of foreign entanglement, the
Chinese government weighs the sensitivity of the global political environment versus the
level of dissent against the Communist Party in China. In the most recent case, domestic
legitimacy ruled.
Competing Nationalists
Following on the heels of practical annexation of the Senkaku islets by the
Japanese national government, China experienced major popular protests in 85 Chinese
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cities.115 The arc of events leading to these protests is important for understanding the
various political forces which prop up the Senkaku dispute. The crisis was originally
created by nationalist groups in Japan, a pattern followed by many of the Senkaku flareups. The mayor of Tokyo prefecture, Ishihara Shintaro, led a nationwide campaign
fundraising to purchase the Senkaku islets from their private Japanese owner, in the
hopes of gifting the islands to his prefectural government.116 His mayoral administration
in Tokyo promised to aggressively defend the islets, in keeping with Japanese nationalist
views on the dispute. This put the central government in an untenable position.
The national government of Japan, led by Abe Shinzo, opted to pre-empt Mayor
Ishihara’s nationalization. The islets being administered by Ishihara was a surefire recipe
for international furor to be led by China, Japan’s largest trading partner. Nationalization
by the national government, however, sought to reduce one element of the agitation for
China, which would be the ostensible follow-on offenses that Ishihara would likely cause.
The original agitant was predictably sufficient to incense the Chinese government, and
although the extent of the backlash was unprecedented, the fallout bolstered moderate
conservative forces in Japan. This pattern of behavior is played on by Japanese
ultranationalists. As the ultranationalists have little mainstream electoral support, they
pursue theatrical agitation in the hopes of stoking a (likely disproportionate) foreign
response that might increase their domestic support.
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Japanese ultranationalists are domestically unpopular for a number of reasons.
Japan, like Germany, places a tremendous amount of blame for the disaster of the Pacific
War on rampant nationalism. As a result, public opinion is widely ambivalent to the
erosion of post-war safeguards, such as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. While
much attention has been allotted to embarrassing equivocation on official apologies
regarding abuses during the imperial occupation of Asia, the matter of war guilt is a
settled issue for much of the Japanese electorate. Resistance to military involvement in
the Middle East and recent protests against reinterpreting Article 9 to allow for the
defense of allies highlight this uneasiness. Electorally, this puts the ultranationalists at a
fundamental disadvantage.
Far-right wing groups exist outside of the mainstream political discourse for
practical reasons, as well. An estimated 900 ultranationalist groups exist in Japan, with
some 10,000 members under police surveillance. More than half of these organizations
are thought to be fronts for the yakuza, or Japanese organized crime.117 These
associations are difficult to hide, given the abrupt techniques that both groups use to exert
public influence. Far-right wing groups rely on gaisensha, or sound trucks, to broadcast
their political views given a lack of effective media access. These trucks take part in
symbolic protests, broadcasting patriotic music and nationalist speeches. Infrequently,
mainstream candidates use sound trucks to back their candidacy as well. Police do not
generally interfere with the trucks as a salve to free speech, although police presence is
noticeably intense and unsympathetic during anticipated protests. These noisy attempts to
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sway popular opinion are indicative of the general disenfranchisement of Japan’s extreme
right.
By using strategic protests, ultranationalists can broadcast their views further. As
mentioned previously, groups such as the Nihon Seinensha, or the nationalist Japan
Youth Federation, have jerry-rigged lighthouses on the Senkaku islets and requested
official government sanction after the fact. The government is invariably hostile to their
intent (for fear of proving Chinese propaganda claims of widespread militarism in Japan),
but the damage is already done. The Chinese government publicly denounces the
Japanese, frequently with a show of military brinksmanship. This, in turn, worries both
the Japanese public and government, pressuring them to adopt a more conservative
stance. This was the precise series of events followed in the most recent Senkaku flareup: Mayor Ishihara’s showmanship forced the Japanese government to act, to which the
Chinese government reacted threateningly, and aggressive military maneuvering by the
Chinese bolsters conservative causes in Japan.
While the far-right of Japan has successfully manipulated international events,
they are unable to effectively garner support to their cause. More credible conservative
forces, namely in the ruling LDP coalition, forestall a rise of Japanese conservatism in the
imperial mold. Both the taboo of military boosterism and the connections to organized
crime relegate Japan’s nationalists to the electoral fringe. While successful in goading the
Chinese Communist government, which escalates the situation to shape its own domestic
political environment, the Japanese ultranationalists are unable to convert media attention
into a credible political force. For instance, Japan has a vibrant protest culture, largely
due to faithfully enforced Freedom of Assembly protections. In the recent push to
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reinterpret Article 9 of the constitution to allow for defensive military actions overseas,
over 10,000 Japanese protestors picketed Prime Minister Abe’s residence. By
comparison, in response to widespread anti-Japan protests in China, ultranationalists
organized an anti-China protest in Tokyo. Around 50 people were reported in attendance,
with many of them members of the press corps.118 So, while Japanese ultranationalists are
able to trigger international incidents which further conservative causes generally, they
are unable to convert that influence into popular support of their movement.
The case of Chinese nationalism is altogether more complicated. As in most
avenues of life, the Chinese Communist Party intervenes substantially in public
demonstrations. Public gatherings other than those sponsored by the government are
highly illegal, with prominent dissidents periodically arrested on the suspicion that they
might be planning to protest.119 That being said, not all protests are treated as equals.
Public marches against corruption or in memorial of government abuses are quickly
stifled, with participants and their families facing stern government countermeasures.
Displays of anti-foreign aggression, however, are sometimes allowed space for
expression. Understanding how the Chinese government views its people’s nationalism
as a resource and a threat is key to predicting how the government will behave.
In the most recent case, the nationalization of the Senkaku islands provoked a
widespread response in the Chinese-speaking world. Mainland China had major antiJapan protests in 85 cities, with considerable violence. Icons of Japan in China were
targeted by mobs of angry protestors, leading to several major manufacturers and retailers
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to momentarily suspending operations. Even at the smallest level, Japanese-affiliated
businesses suffered; Japanese restaurants, frequently owned and operated by HanChinese restaurateurs, hung Chinese national flags and boarded up their businesses to
prevent damage. Drivers of Japanese-branded automobiles were in several instances
dragged out of their cars and beaten, while vandalism of foreign manufactured
automobiles was widespread. Protests were allowed to continue for roughly a week
before the Chinese government resumed its normal strict policing of public gatherings.
That is not to say that the Chinese government was disinterested. Communicating
through state-controlled media, official editorials encouraged the protests. In a signed
editorial of the digital Chinese-language edition of the People’s Daily, among the most
official of sources available to the Chinese public, the government encouraged people to
take to the streets. 120 Consider the following selection from the since-removed editorial,
published midweek during the height of the protests:
Defending the core interests of the motherland (the S/D islands in this case- KM)
is a moral contest. In a confrontation between the righteous and unrighteous, we
cannot be dragged along by the scoundrels of Japan. In globalizing, we should let
the world see the peaceful rise of China, while the current government continues
to improve the quality of its citizens. A great era requires a great people. The
Japanese right-wing fears the most powerful Chinese people. Rational patriotism
(rational frequently coded as nonviolent- KM) struggles for strong governance,
carefully running the country, in order to faithfully protect the country and
national dignity. 121

The official narrative is encouraging to Chinese citizens on the march, bolstering routine
slogans of nationalism with a call to popular action. The author encourages his readers to
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boycott Japanese goods in a rare call to civic activism. In issuing this sort of plea, the
government seeks to bolster its negotiating position by pointing to popular discontent.
This is only unusual in China due to the government fomenting the dissent through direct
encouragement. Elsewhere in the editorial, denunciations of Japan are typically shrill.
“Irrational violence,” or that which is not government sanctioned, is gently rebuked.
Above all, Communist leadership is emphasized as the steward of a renewed, feared
Chinese nation. The direct incitement of popular unrest by the PRC government must be
a potential cause for embarrassment, as the People’s Daily did not translate the article
and deleted it after the Chinese-language version was linked by China watchers at the
New York Times.
In considering when the Chinese government allows the very real popular anger
over the Senkaku dispute to boil over into public protests, a pattern emerges. On 55
occasions between 1978 and 2007, anti-Japan protests have taken place in the PRC. On
12 occasions in the same time frame, the Chinese Communist Party quashed
demonstrations immediately.122 With the Senkaku islets as a frequent international
agitant, the Party has the option of encouraging protests to rally its citizens around the
flag, or to immediately suppress protests as a salve to international cooperation.
Suppression comes with costs to legitimacy, which appears to be the Communist Party’s
paramount resource, and thus anti-Japan protests are rarely suppressed. This pattern will
likely continue, as China’s economic and military power grows relative to regional
powers, the incentive toward self-restraint will be diminished. International belligerence
will likely be the less costly option.
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By comparison, Japanese ultranationalists are a group that the government has
little incentive to interact with. Being small and viewed as unseemly in Japan and abroad,
the Japanese nationalist cause cannot be successfully expressed as a mass movement.
International reactions, particularly from China, are sufficiently unpredictable that the
risk-adverse Japanese government does not seem eager to manipulate the ultranationalists
for electoral gain. The Japanese government fumbles with its response to the nationalists,
however, which ensures that China is periodically given an opportunity to vent popular
unrest outwards, which it sometimes capitalizes on. With civil liberties and an
independent press corps, Japan cannot afford to simply silence its ultranationalists
through repression. Nor should Japan suppress its fringe extralegally, as domestic
extremists are an unavoidable part of a liberal democratic system, despite that system
being the bedrock which prevents the popularization of extremism.
In China, a balance is struck which uses international grievances like the Senkaku
dispute as a pressure valve for popular discontent. In a somewhat open authoritarian
system, repression is politically costly. Unless the international climate is especially
sensitive, or the demonstrations are aimed at the domestic government, there is little
incentive for an authoritarian regime to interfere initially. So it follows in China.
Increasingly, China allows its public to vent popular discontent towards Japan as a salve
to popular will in government decision-making. While this bolsters domestic legitimacy
in China, it also increases the risk of subsequent territorial disputes: informed by a
restricted body of government-sanctioned information sources, the Chinese public has
fostered a severe antipathy towards the Japanese. Risk may be compounded by future
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events where the Chinese government cannot easily suppress anti-Japan protests for fear
of insurrection, but cannot also act on the protestors’ wishes for fear of war.
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CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS
The Senkaku Islands are not important for their own sake. Even with liberal
interpretations of Exclusive Economic Zones, the economic gains that could be extracted
by holding the islets are little compared to the increasing economic insecurity caused by
contesting the islets. Particularly given developments in the related Chunxiao Gas Fields
absent a settlement on the Senkakus, even this minor economic advantage does not hinge
on legal sovereignty over the land itself. Of course, the islands are tiny and uninhabited,
lending no importance to them for the purposes of protecting citizens. It is unlikely that
the Chinese government would contest the issue of sovereignty at great risk for the sole
purpose of reclaiming a tiny corner of its imperial antiquity. The puzzle for this study,
then, is to identify the key drivers for the conflict, so that productive solutions can be
proposed to curb the recent trend toward escalation.
The pronouncements of the involved parties are of little use for determining actual
motivations. Escalation of the Senkaku Dispute in 2012 and 2013 led directly to a
relaxation on restrictions of Japan’s formidable Self-Defense Force participating in
international drills, most notably with the United States Marine Corps, practicing
amphibious landings on contested islands. The reinterpretation of the pacific clause of the
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Japanese constitution has likewise signaled a deepening commitment in Japanese
governance to military preparedness.123 These moves toward a normalized military stance
are described by Prime Minister Abe as a strategy of “proactive pacifism,” which while
this is an internationally supported and moderate transition, it is by no means a strategy of
pacifism. The Japanese government appears increasingly prepared to defend the
territorial status quo using military force, as well as aid regional allies if other territorial
disputes with China spill into armed conflict.
The Chinese government’s official statements are equally unhelpful for
determining causes and solutions to the conflict. Given the tight media controls in place
on the mainland, where Chinese leadership places an overwhelming emphasis,
international pronouncements are largely unrelated to policy debates at home. At the
2014 Shangri-La Dialogue on Asian security in Singapore, the leadership of the Chinese
military envoy concluded his otherwise unremarkable restatement of Chinese government
policies by going off script. Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong commented on Japan’s
“provocative stance” on the disputed islands, stating that China had only peaceful
intentions and reserved its military force for responding to other nations’
“provocations.”124 Predictably, other delegates proceeded to quiz the general, who
declined to respond to most questions regarding China’s many other ongoing territorial
disputes. The extremely provocative air-defense cordon over the islets, which causes
regular near-misses between Japanese SDF surveillance aircraft and armed Chinese
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fighters as of July 2014, goes unmentioned. We can presume that the general’s comments
were governmentally supported, as the English-language edition of the People’s Daily
substantively confirms them.125
In covering the same Shangri-La Dialogue, the People’s Daily asserts that
Chinese possession of the Senkaku islets stretches back 2,000 years to Han Dynasty
antiquity. In an interesting rhetorical flourish, the propagandists note that no neighboring
nation challenged this imperial claim until oil resources were surveyed in the region in
1971. Of course, this is a reversal of the argument that China did not contest Japanese
sovereignty over the islands until oil was discovered, a more specifically backed claim
that is frequently reported on in international media. As imperial antecedents are given as
evidence of disputed territory, an observer would expect a host of Chinese territorial
disputes. While such a body of disputes exists, it does not exist in nearly the same
dimensions as suggested by China’s old imperial borders, which when one includes
tributary states stretched from Southeast Asia to northern edge of Siberia. As such, the
stated rationale for continuing the dispute may appear more irreconcilable than the actual
cause. In short, as evidenced by the lack of armed conflict up to this point, the situation is
may not be as grave as it appears.
Historically, the Chinese have shown willingness to temporarily compromise on
the island dispute issue once disputing the issue has served its purpose. Preceding the
Fishing Expedition of the 1970s, the Chinese government had pursued Japanese
cooperation in a pan-Asian front against the Soviet Union. Unable to gain external
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security through diplomatic negotiations, and deeply insecure against internal challenges
in the wake of Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping used the disputed islands as an opportunity to
rally the fractious country around his premiership. This is an example of Chinese
leadership weighing internal and external threats, in the style suggested by regime
insecurity theory. Consider the question of omni-balance as the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship hit early stumbling blocks. Unable to gain external protection and faced with a
sudden influx of internal instability from an uncertain transfer of power, the PRC opted to
raise international conflict as a cause to rally the Chinese public and Communist cadres
around Deng’s government.
Economic and political unrest wracked China during the First Lighthouse Incident
in 1989. Japanese ultranationalists took to the islands to both bolster their support at
home as well as provoke a Chinese overreaction which might further the same cause.
China faced pressure on multiple fronts: Japan, then an unchallenged regional economic
dynamo, was a key player in Deng Xiaoping’s plan for economic revitalization. Policies
had been enacted which undid the PRC’s social safety net, in a process known as reform
with losers. While this enabled China’s later economic growth, it also triggered social
unrest. Public desire for a political opening to match economic liberalization ultimately
culminated in the Tiananmen Movement and massacre. The subsequent international
environment was extremely hostile to the Communist government, at a moment when the
PRC required foreign cooperation. As a result, the Senkaku flare-up was quickly
overlooked by the PRC, demonstrating the government’s pragmatism in addressing
territorial compromises.
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With the fall of the Soviet Union and the rapid expansion of regional economies
other than Japan, the post-Cold War period saw tremendous restructuring for Asia. The
government of the PRC, just settling into a pattern of unprecedented and sustained
economic growth, viewed itself as internationally insecure. Having abandoned the
ideological core of communism, shown to be moribund with the fall of the USSR,
Chinese party leaders faced challenges from other contenders to Chinese legitimacy.
Taiwan and Hong Kong both offered governmental systems which provided the
prosperity that the PRC pursued, but without the security apparatus built up over a half
century of Communist rule.
The Second Lighthouse Incident in 1996 highlighted these Chinese-speaking
challenges to party legitimacy, as the mainland vied with Taiwan and Hong Kong to
represent territorial claims against Japan. With the death of popular Hong Kong activist
David Chan in the South China Seas, the mainland leadership quickly quashed the island
dispute and tightly muted any further news that would lionize the Hong Konger. The
Third Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-96, where the PRC launched missiles into the sea
adjacent Taiwan, can also be viewed in the light of stymying foreign challengers to
domestic legitimacy. These events again demonstrated the central focus of PRC
leadership on maintaining internal support, even where economic or territorial expansion
need be sacrificed.
With its economic reforms reaching maturity, the PRC entered the twenty-first
century as a rapidly developing regional heavyweight. With Russia simultaneously
weakened and solicitous of better relations, there are few external military threats to the
Chinese. Domestically, the story is more complicated. Rapid economic development
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builds party legitimacy by increasing standards of living, but also creates social problems
such as inequality, internal migration, and corruption, all of which must be managed.
While the PRC is uncommonly comfortable intervening in its citizens’ private lives to
stymy political unrest, there are costs to legitimacy paid for this sort of governmental
intervention. The ostensible motivation for the 2005 Senkaku flare-up was the arrest of
Chinese nationalists planting flags on the islets by Japanese coast guard personnel.
Government controlled media in China enflamed the issue, the purpose being two-fold.
First, the image of a foreign menace allowed the PRC to vent outward mounting internal
dissatisfaction with the changes of economic reform. Second, natural gas technology had
advanced sufficiently to allow the possibility of profitable resource extraction from the
adjacent Chunxiao Gas Fields. As constant economic growth is seen as a vital component
to suppressing domestic challenges to legitimacy, the Chinese government prizes values
it like a strategic resource. Likely unintended, but not considered dangerous enough to
suppress, public outrage over the dispute ran particularly hot. This nationalistic anger sets
the tone for future territorial disputes, and suggests a problematic pattern of escalation.
The most recent Nationalization Crisis of 2012-13 gives us a troubling insight into
the future. Pushed by Japanese ultranationalists attempting to purchase the disputed islets
from their private owner, the Japanese government pre-emptively purchased the islets to
avoid further embarrassment. At the height of its economic development, China
perceived more internal threats than external, including ongoing unrest in Xinjiang and
Tibet paired with a contentious integration of Hong Kong. As a result, the PRC saw little
to be gained through restraining public opinion, and instead utilized its press controls to
exacerbate anti-Japanese sentiments. Restrictions curtailing public gatherings went
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unenforced, and wide-spread protests ensued as citizens felt out the government’s
position.
To understand this most recent wave of conflict over the islands, we must
consider the costs and benefits apparent to the Chinese government in pursuing the
territorial dispute. The gains to domestic legitimacy are most salient. In internal Chinese
military documents, the preservation of the Communist Party at the head of the
government leads all other concerns, setting the Chinese apart from most governments of
the world.126 It is fair to view this as a central goal of the government, and perhaps the
single most emphasized goal of the government. To this end, fomenting territorial
disputes is beneficial as a recurring cause to rally a diverse and restive population around
the flag.
While the costs of ongoing territorial disputes are considerable, in the short term
they are externalized. Diplomatic relations with the Japanese government have certainly
suffered. Private businesses are voicing uncommon concerns with Chinese instability in
light of the violence. As multiple nations experience similar erratic behavior interacting
with the PRC, they are driven closer together, despite sharing a problematic history.
Vietnam, South Korea, and the Philippines all have active territorial disputes with China,
and despite having all been occupied by Japan during the Pacific War, find themselves in
the same security situation vis-à-vis the aggressively expansionary China.127 This selfimposed isolation, while detrimental to the PRC’s long term strategic outlook, will do
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little to damage internal governing legitimacy. The greatest risk to that paramount
resource of the CCP is that, as the dispute over the Senkaku island persists into the future,
an infuriated public will demand that the government take action. In this way, the island
dispute might turn from convenient propaganda into a serious issue for PRC leadership.
As demonstrated in other areas, Chinese central leadership is ill-inclined to risk internal
ruling legitimacy as a salve to external demands, and may be forced by popular anger to
act.
Over the course of the post-Cold War period, China has sidelined its territorial
ambitions to create space for economic growth without international disputes spoiling the
process. True core interests, typically where large numbers of ethnic Han Chinese were in
residence, formed the exception to this general rule. Deng Xiaoping was the greatest
early proponent of this developmental focus, pivoting away from the ideological massmovements of Mao. Deng ensured that his protégés, able technocrats with formal
preparation in economics such as Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongji, reached the offices of
highest power in the Communist system.128 Witnessing the fall of the Soviet system,
Deng saw economic growth as the only way to avoid the disastrous splintering which
disempowered the Soviet bloc. He was explicit in his negotiations with the Politburo in
1991: “There is no other option open to us. If the economy cannot be boosted, over the
long run, we will lose the people’s support.” He continued to describe the alternative to
development as being “oppressed and bullied by other nations throughout the world. A
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continuation of such a situation will only lead to the collapse of the Chinese Communist
Party.”129
This focus on economic development in modern Chinese international policy is
best encapsulated in Deng’s dictum to future leaders. The slogan taoguang yanghui, or to
“avoid the limelight” until the nation was sufficiently developed to counter foreign
challenges, explains a policy of increasing international assertiveness in China. As China
grows by leaps and bounds, leveraging an export-oriented industrial sector with favorable
currency manipulation, the importance of staying out of foreign entanglements is
reduced. Particularly in the case of Japan, where a cosmology-wrecking military defeat
lingers in recent memory, China is prepared for belligerence on the world stage. This
trend of increased assertiveness is the best evidence for a Chinese regime
overwhelmingly concerned with its hold on domestic power, a central argument of
regime insecurity theory.
The impulse to safeguard domestic policy-making prerogatives is evident in
China’s willingness to endanger trade ties. As discussed prior, China and Japan are
deeply interconnected economies. China’s ascension to the World Trade Organization
spurred large-scale Japanese foreign direct investment in Chinese industries. The result of
this new opening was an ongoing boom in Chinese manufactures and a substantial
recovery for the Japanese economy. The willingness of China to jeopardize these
business relationships, given the Chinese Communist Party’s evident focus on economic
growth, is conspicuous. The motivation lies in the domestic power that comes from
controlling the terms of economic growth. In a telling vignette, Richard McGregor
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describes hard-line negotiating tactics used against Mitsubishi Electric in establishing a
plant outside of Shanghai. The Chinese government negotiators were willing to risk the
success of the plant, and lucrative foreign investment, over the issue of Communist Party
committees in the plant’s organization.130 As the party committees gave the central
government the ability to shut down plant operations on command (through enforced
striking, for instance), a substantial measure of control was won. Investment from certain
countries abroad is treated as both a resource to be exploited and a threat to be contained.
Viewing economic entanglement with the outside world as a threat has a long
history in Chinese politics. Late Qing Dynasty rulers blocked foreign trade entirely,
before being forced to open select treaty ports during the Century of Humiliation.
Revolutionary China tightly controlled international trade, centralizing foreign interaction
and trading responsibilities into vetted cadres’ hands. During the initial phases of
economic reform under Deng Xiaoping, Special Economic Zones controlled the
geographic space for investment. Thusly, foreign contact with the Chinese public could
be tightly circumscribed. These policies of limitation and control of economic intrusion
demonstrate the Chinese government’s perception of overseas investment. There is,
however, a notable exception. From the Chinese-speaking world, investment is welcomed
with relatively few barriers of trade, suggesting the governmental objection is at least in
part against foreign cultures. This bipolar policy towards foreign investment fits readily
within the framework of regime insecurity theory, as FDI that represents little threat to
the ruling system is encouraged while investment from without is casually jeopardized.
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For instance, while Japanese FDI to China rose dramatically in the early 2000s, it
paled in comparison to the investment going to mainland China from Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan. Of these investment sources, Hong Kong is among the largest.
Given that Hong Kong was absorbed in the PRC as a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) in 1997, it is only somewhat politically foreign and thus perceived as less
threatening. Like the other Chinese-speaking sources of investment, Hong Kong is
culturally and ethnically similar to the mainland, which leads to preferential treatment.
Hong Kong’s proximity to the mainland gives it substantial advantages for maneuvering
in the semi-socialist market, including access to insider information ahead of competitors.
Given the aforementioned government involvement in the minute operations of business,
this insider access is critical. These advantages are codified in treaties as well, with the
PRC offering Hong Kong SAR firms early access to industrial sectors opened up for
WTO membership.131 With ready access to capital from the Chinese-speaking world, the
government of the PRC has little economic incentive to preserve its relationship with
Japan. This is especially true given the political distance between China and Japan, which
the Chinese government views as less controllable than Hong Kong or Taiwan, both of
which are within arm’s reach.
One of the puzzles of the Senkaku dispute is the willingness of China to spoil its
international rapport with Japan, given that the post-industrial nation is a massive
prospective marketplace. Analyzing the economic development of the two countries
reveals that the two nations are increasingly joined by trade ties. Japanese investment in
the mainland rose rapidly in the early 2000s, and although total FDI figures are still well
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below overseas Chinese communities, the additional influx of capital lends to China’s
economic dynamism. Liberal theorists predict that increasing financial ties raise the cost
of conflict between two states, thus promoting cooperation and peace. Clearly, as
evidenced by the sharp deterioration in relations between the two states at the height of
their economic entanglement, the theory does not hold in this case. Just as the Communist
Party leadership worried that poverty would loosen their hold on domestic power after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, now the opposite is the case. Uncontrolled prosperity
runs the risk of rendering the iron-fisted authoritarian regime obsolete, a durable key
consideration of the leadership clique. Regime insecurity theory predicts this transition
during times of economic growth, especially the focus on controlling disruptive internal
forces and maintaining domestic power.132 Chinese leadership, with the ultimate goal of
internal hegemony, takes actions that preclude high rates of Japanese investment by
creating a poisonous international atmosphere. This draws on historical antecedents in
Chinese governance, viewing foreign investment obligations as an undesirable
compromise to domestic ruling power.
Consider the following calculations of trade dependency over the history of the
Senkaku dispute. In Figure 8, trade dependency over time is charted with an overlay of
major island unrest. Returning to our first hypothesis, we can see that China is more
secure than ever in terms of GDP, a measure that is converted into military power and
influential trade ties. This transition is followed by an increase in severity in recent
Senkaku disputes, largely due to Chinese escalation. For instance, the 2005 outbreak
featured substantial anti-Japanese violence in mainland protests, despite the evident

132

Fravel, “Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy,” 181.

98

willingness of PRC security forces to contain and control other public gatherings. In 2012
and 2013, the most disruptive disputes yet emerged, with both considerably violent
protests as well as associated military posturing. Both the expansion of the aerial ADIZ
as well as provocative traversing of warships in the Miyaku Straits mark an increase in
military gamesmanship over the islands. Given that the most severe disruptions occurred
at the height of economic growth, we can see that our first hypothesis is substantively
confirmed.
Our second hypothesis addresses the role of trade in the island dispute. Recall that
island incidents are classified into three categories based on the severity of conflict they
entail: incidents are minor, moderate, or severe. Minor events lack violent popular
protests or associated military maneuvers, moderate events include violent popular
protests or military maneuvers, and the yet-to-materialize severe incident would be
characterized by active warfare. We can see that the two most recent incidents fall into
this moderate category, with the most recently being markedly more disruptive due to a
combination of belligerent policies. The four disputes prior to 2005 were in the minor
category, by comparison.
This escalation of belligerence is particularly interesting given the height of trade
entanglement coinciding with the beginning of more aggressive PRC policies, such as the
tolerance of anti-Japan protests and assorted types of military gamesmanship. Beginning
in 2005, a sharp downward trend is observed in Chinese trade dependence on Japan. This
is the product a growing Chinese economy, which reduces the importance of relatively
static Japanese trade, as well as the result of worsening diplomatic ties stemming in part
from the island dispute. For our second hypothesis, we can see that trade plays only a
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partially restraining role against belligerence. On the one hand, heightened trade ties
appear
ar to have discomfited the Chinese leadership and led to policies to cool economic
interchange. On the other hand, armed conflict has been successfully avoided by both
parties. As a result, we can measure our second hypothesis as confirmed, with the
qualification
ication that the restraint is not complete.

12

Trade dependency quotient

10

8

6

4

2

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

0

China, trade dependence on
Japan
Japan, trade dependence on
China

Figure 8: Trade Dependency
ndency between Japan and China O
Overlaid with Disputes.
isputes. 133
Of particular interest to our study is the inversion of trade dependency illustrated
since the mid-2000ss in Figure 8.134 Recall that trade dependency is calculated as the
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quotient of combined trade (imports and exports) and GDP. As Japan’s GDP has
remained relatively static, a mild tendency toward increased trade reliance on China is
illustrated accurately. The PRC, however, has experienced substantial growth in GDP,
with the effect of trade dependency calculations understating shifts in dependency.
Thusly, the sharp downward trend in Chinese trade dependency on Japan is a remarkable
departure from the relationship existing up to 2006. Coming so soon after a historic high
point in trade in the early 2000s, the downward shift may be an intended effect of
increasing pressure on the Senkaku issue.
The Senkaku dispute is thus a two-pronged tool for the Chinese government. On
the one hand, by reacting strongly to Japanese ultranationalists, Chinese leadership can
chill Sino-Japanese relations. This opens investment space for more politically pliable
investors, limiting the potential for foreign interference and increasing internal hegemony
on the mainland. The second element of the Senkaku issue is its ability to stoke Chinese
nationalist sentiments. While China’s increased military budget has attracted much
international attention, particularly its investment in offensive deep-water capabilities
aimed at challenging American naval control of the region, the domestic security budget
has gone largely unnoticed. Domestic security, including capabilities used to monitor and
suppress dissidents, has grown in larger portions than military funding. The issue has
become acutely sensitive, with the obvious implication that the Chinese government
needs intense internal security support to maintain power. As a result of public scrutiny,
the government discontinued publishing complete internal security budgets in 2014.135 As
imposing government through repressions entails damage to internal legitimacy, raising
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the Senkaku issue presents a welcome opportunity for the PRC regime to redirect
dissatisfaction outward at a low cost to its domestic standing.
In this way, incentives to manage nationalist sentiments in Japan and China are
roughly the inverse of one another. For the Japanese government, ultranationalists are a
costly embarrassment. Routine outbursts from small, fringe organizations endanger vital
trade ties to countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. This political friction also creates
the possibility of weakened alliances between the democratic powers which
counterbalance mainland China. As discussed previously, the ultranationalist groups such
as Ganbare Nippon and Nihon Seinensha are unable to secure substantial domestic
political support. They are, however, able to use political theater to goad China into
overreactions which drive mainstream political opinions in Japan towards moderate
conservatism. Even so, the Japanese government’s development strategy relies on
international goodwill to maintain trading relationships, and thus the ultranationalists
represent an unacceptable risk to collude with. Of course, Japan is a liberal democracy,
and cannot simply repress its vocal minority of agitators. Nor should Japan seek to
repress the ultras, as nations with open access to information can see that the nationalists
represent a small portion of the Japanese people, with the majority relegating them to
seedy corners of political activism.
The Chinese government faces an altogether different calculus when dealing with
nationalism. With a historical legacy that focuses on threats from abroad, appeals to
nationalist sentiments create a political arms race.136 Appealing to the Chinese people’s
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sense of historical grievance against Japan is seen as a politically less costly alternative to
repression for maintaining domestic control. This manipulation of public opinion leads to
several, likely unintended, consequences.
As seen in the 1990s flare-ups of the Senkaku crisis, the PRC is acutely interested
in being seen as the most valid representative of Chinese national interest. If other
contenders, such as Taiwan or Hong Kong, present a more robust and politically credible
resistance to perceived foreign aggression, that decreases the Communist regime’s
domestic legitimacy. For this reason, the PRC censored the death of a Hong Kong activist
attempting to land on the Senkaku islets, so as to not be outmaneuvered by a political
rival. The persistence of multiple claimants reduces the ability of the PRC to back away
from the Senkakus without losing legitimacy, thus constraining China’s political
freedom-to-maneuver. In the event of competing powers reaching political settlements
with Japan, however, the Chinese motivations could change to encourage a more
conciliatory posture.
Another unintended consequence of exploiting the Senkaku issue for domestic
legitimacy is the difficult task of controlling nationalist anger. Under a steady diet of
information focused on foreign grievances, the Chinese public has formed a substantial
undercurrent of popular anti-Japanese sentiment. Protests frequently feature nasty
displays of racism, such as the ubiquitous xiao riben picket signs. 137 While the Chinese
government made space for mass protests in 2012 by relaxing severe security restrictions
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on public demonstrations, the security apparatus did not need to stoke public anger over
the nationalization of the Senkaku islets. Widespread popular rage was in evidence
despite initially soft-spoken calls for calm from official media sources. The virulence of
nationalism in mainland China represents a threat to both the control of the Communist
Party over the PRC and to regional security.
Key to regional security, the military balance of power has experienced tectonic
shifts in Northeast Asia. There is no common consensus on the goals of Chinese military
buildup. Fravel argues that the military buildup is largely oriented towards bolstering
internal security, citing amongst other evidence a sharp increase in non-combat mission
briefs in declassified Chinese military journals, particularly since the Jasmine Revolution
was suggested as a Chinese parallel to the Arab Spring.138 This internal focus does not
reduce the possible deterrent effect of amassing military power for defensive purposes, a
frequent focus of speeches by powerful figures in the PRC political chain-ofcommand.139 This view is not universally accepted, however. Pempel suggests that
belligerent Chinese behavior, notably over the Senkaku islands and the expansion of
territorial “core interests” to include islands disputed by other nations, presents a risk to
regional security.140 These policies trigger worries that a strong economy goes hand-inhand with a hard-line security posture for China. Analysts at the Naval War College share
similar concerns due to the relative wane of the Japanese economy, creating a dangerous
imbalance of military power and a disincentive for the PRC to compromise.141 With this
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theoretical disagreement in mind, let us consider forms of military might as they affect
China’s negotiating posture over the disputed islands.
One static factor in analyzing China’s willingness to compromise in territorial
disputes is land-based military might. While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
recently surged in professionalism and technological sophistication, Chinese capabilities
have remained consistently superior to nations sharing a land border and involved in
territorial disputes. The one exception is along the long Russian border, where the
strategic balance is also static. Rather than clear Chinese dominance, the mutual backstop
of nuclear weapons and large, standing armies has created a strategic stalemate. As such,
shifts in military force will likely do little to shape the behavior of claimants in landbased territorial disputes, as the basic strategic balance is locked-in for the foreseeable
future.142 This military might does not ensure that the Communist regime holds all areas
of the empire with equal security, as political insecurity is one of the primary drivers of
military spending. It does, however, dissuade international challengers: territorial
compromise with nations along the long frontier does not broadcast weakness in the PRC,
which might encourage expanded claims or aggressive maneuvering amongst neighbors
if they did not find the threat of force credible.
Overseas territorial disputes do not enjoy the same theoretical simplicity. China’s
relatively underdeveloped navy is a contributing factor to the lack of compromise evident
in overseas territorial disputes. Given severe limitations to pressing international claims
over blue water, Chinese leadership likely considers concessions as a possible signal of
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weakness.143 China developing its naval capabilities creates a theoretical opening for
future compromise, although the apparent purpose of China’s naval expansion is near-sea
dominance, more likely to be employed as a screening force for landing on Taiwan than
an extremely expensive negotiating prop.144 The Chinese PLA Navy is expanding at great
economic cost, with a likely aim towards adding a credible threat to already aggressive
South and East China Sea posturing. The propping up of multiple island disputes fuels
this pattern of naval expansion, and ultimately that trend shapes Chinese territorial
negotiating prerogatives.
The balance of power in the Pacific is at present mutually beneficial enough to
stem military challenges over territorial disputes, but that balance may not persist into the
future. As China continues to press international claims against numerous neighbors, the
government policy of using these claims as a rallying cry is likely to remain unchanged.
As this creates mounting xenophobia, it will be more difficult and politically costly to
countermand. Without an intervening policy change by the Chinese government,
eventually this balance between stoking nationalism and accepting the territorial status
quo will require an unenviable decision. Confronted with popular protests over a
predictable international provocation, likely an intentional jab delivered by Japanese
ultranationalists, the Chinese government will be required to suppress its population or
act on the popular demands to claim the contested territory. Faced with a decision
between domestic unrest and international conflict, historical precedents indicate that
Chinese leadership would pay extreme prices to maintain home rule.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
Policy Recommendations
The complexity of the Senkaku issue and the intensity of the nationalist
sentiments involved have bedeviled diplomatic solutions to the crisis. In particular, the
United States has shown a rare amount of indecision in announcing a position on the
islands for the purpose of the mutual defense treaty. American State Department
negotiators, seeing a sharp upsurge in popular anger and tending to delicate relations with
allied Taiwan, hedged toward neutrality during the reversion crisis of 1971.145 In a
legalistic dodge, the American stance on the islets stated that reverting territory to Japan
did not acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over it. As time passed without resolution,
animosities over the islands ossified. While the current American stance does not
preclude peaceful negotiations over the islets, such as pursued by Taiwan, it does include
the Senkaku islets under the umbrella of the US-Japanese security treaty.146 This step
prevents China from misinterpreting American resolve for intervention, such as when
South Korea was left outside of the announced American security cordon in the 1950s.
To peacefully defuse the Senkaku crisis, the United States should continue its
policy of clearly signaling its position on the island chain. As China secures domestic
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benefits by pursuing the crisis, no amount of concessions short of possession of the islets
will likely improve Sino-American relations. Additionally, even during the early period
of American neutrality, public media in China castigated the American position as being
pro-Japanese. As such, pressuring allies into making concessions would likely be
fruitless, as the PRC is independently committed to sustaining the conflict. The United
States acts as a security buffer, creating space for a diplomatic settlement to be found.
This may require substantial shifts within the domestic politics of the PRC, but there is
reason to believe that existing trends favor moderation.
For its part, Japan has perhaps the most difficult balancing act in resolving the
crisis. The Senkaku issue is tied to a handful of supremely sensitive wartime legacies. As
mentioned prior, ultranationalists are a fact of political life in Japan. Rule of law and
robust civil rights are a greater prize than a country free of irritating fringe political
factions. However, the Japanese government could improve its reputation in East Asia
and reduce the threat of constant territorial revisionism by remaining unequivocal on
wartime apologies. Waffling on the classification of Korean “comfort women,” for
instance, needlessly endangers Japan’s reconciliation with regional neighbors. This is
taken in tandem with the poor treatment of Japanese citizens of Korean descent, ancestors
of those affected by early-1900s Japanese colonization, which is another needlessly
provocative policy that could be easily rectified to ease world opinion. Issuing an
unequivocal apology, and then standing by it, would not halt international complaints of
an unapologetic Japan. Media within the People’s Republic of China will likely castigate
Japan regardless of its substantive stances, for the aforementioned reason of stoking
domestic nationalism. A standard wartime statement of contrition, in the style of the
108

Kono Report, would increase Japan’s moral authority on the world stage and reassure
regional allies to the totality of Japan’s post-war transformation.
In dealing with the Senkaku dispute specifically, Japanese diplomats have
pursued a productive line of negotiations with alternate claimants. The government of
Japan and Taiwan, for instance, reached a mutually beneficial island-sharing pact for the
Senkaku and Diaoyutai islets in the summer of 2014.147 By defusing the tensely
nationalistic situation and encouraging productive cooperation, the two democracies set a
pattern for increased prosperity. Given that the islands are barren and uninhabited, this
trade of concessions opens the door for greater cooperation elsewhere. Ultimately, the
windfall of regional cooperation will be the far greater prize than the inhospitable islands,
or even the prospect of limited oil exploration that the islands might enable. This is a
study of the success of trade ties in encouraging successful cooperation, much as
predicted by liberal peace theory, with the notable absence of an insecure trading partner.
Collaboration with regional neighbors sets the stage for a more secure and prosperous
region. Additionally, as other Chinese-speaking claimants reach settlements with Japan
over collaborative use of the islands, the pressure is reduced on the Communist Party to
one-up potential political rivals from abroad by presenting an aggressive front to Japan.
The People’s Republic of China challenges the status quo of the Senkaku islets, as
well as multiple other land and sea holdings. By aggressively pursuing these territorial
claims, China isolates itself from prospective regional allies and trading partners. Given
the PRC’s explosive economic growth in the last two decades, its ability to peacefully
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influence regional and world events should be on the rise. Chinese diplomatic institutions
have not yet managed to integrate this new influence in a productive manner, instead
falling back on diplomatic methods reminiscent of revolutionary attack diplomacy. As
demonstrated in testing our hypothesis, this routine disruption has worsened in the midst
of growing trade ties. In attempting to secure its economy against Japanese interference,
the Chinese leadership risks both its own economic growth and regional security by
fomenting nationalism. Several academic observers on the mainland wisely identify the
Senkaku islets as insufficiently valuable to warrant great risks to regional relations, and
particularly to Sino-American relations.148 While the Senkaku issue may be too
politically charged to resolve in the near future, the Chinese government could ease
international worries by demilitarizing its dispute responses, in particular by withdrawing
its warplanes from the disputed territory’s airspace.
Domestically, China’s preoccupation with securing Communist Party rule is
leading to unintended consequences. Nationalism is used as a tool of first resort for preempting dissent, with various tools of repression as a backstop. A pliant media and tight
control of information enable this marshaling of popular unrest. None of these factors are
likely to persist into the future, however. The internal security budget, which includes
crowd suppression and internet monitoring capabilities, has ballooned to an
internationally embarrassing extent. Just more than 40 percent of Chinese citizens are
currently accessing the internet, while close to double that proportion has access in Hong
Kong. As the gap closes through widespread development, the government will lose
manual internet censorship as one of its less-destabilizing methods of control. The anti148
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Japan riots of 2012 are an outcropping of this xenophobia cultivated through information
control, and while the government created and then closed the space for protest, the
nationalism may not be so successfully controlled in the future.
Chinese government policy appears to recognize the threat of runaway
nationalism, particularly where it endangers the Communist Party’s rule at home or
ability to act without constraint on the international stage. With protests being closely
monitored to ensure no strains of anti-government views are being promoted, it is clear
that China is concerned with overzealous mass-mobilization. Reducing the intensity of
pro-Chinese nationalism is one way to mitigate the state’s reliance on its security
apparatus to repress dissent. Modest reforms to education, such as modernization and
moderation of “patriotic education,” have been piloted in Shanghai.149 If expanded to the
rest of the country, China may begin to reduce its unhealthy reliance on fear of outsiders
as a rallying political force. While this will not resolve the root territorial disputes, it will
help stabilize the region so that those disputes will see peaceful and mutually acceptable
resolutions.
Openings for Future Research
In analyzing East Asian territorial disputes, a diversity of approaches yields the
most comprehensive understanding of the underlying issues. In particular, the economic
element offers important insights into the motivations of the involved parties, which as
discussed previously, can be difficult to interpret. An interesting contradiction in the
economic material is the stated goal of the Japanese government, and in particular its
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Ministry of Foreign Aid, of using aid and trade to bolster relations with foreign countries
such as the PRC. Further study of the relation between increasing economic cooperation
and its role in dispute management could aid the Japanese government in tailoring
policies that successfully encourage reciprocal cooperative behavior in the region.
Considered at the periphery of this study, the system of “patriotic education” in
China likely also has a large impact on ongoing disputes between China and her
neighbors. A consideration of the development of educational materials over time would
lend important insight into information sources feeding into popular anti-foreign
sentiment, and anti-Japanese sentiment in particular. As records become available
regarding Politburo meetings setting the “patriotic education” system in motion, an
evidentiary basis for analysis of policy will become clear. The result of that policy can be
viewed in the documents set forth as textbooks or supplementary readings to school
students. Finally, polling data would be ideal for tracking the effect of policy and
execution, but would not likely be permitted by the mainland government. The first two
stages of analysis might offer valuable insight into nationalism on the mainland,
regardless.
Summary
The dispute over the Senkaku islands is a challenge to regional security and a
stumbling block for greater economic and diplomatic cooperation in East Asia. Despite a
resolution being in all parties’ ultimate best interest, rogue nationalist factions and shortterm political expedients prevent a satisfactory conclusion. In this stalled diplomatic
environment, routine policies of anti-foreign agitation by the Communist Chinese
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government reach toward destabilizing proportions. While the dispute is unlikely to boil
over into large-scale armed conflict, it does limit both Japan’s and particularly China’s
freedom to maneuver and compromise. Given sufficient time under present conditions,
the PRC’s delaying and propagandizing tactics may lead to critical regional tension in an
already delicate East Asian political environment.
In discussing the historical, economic, and political factors propelling the island
dispute, we have aimed to offer a compelling vision of the nuanced security dilemma of
East Asia. Historical questions, set in motion by the calamity of the Pacific War, which
radically reordered the lives of hundreds of millions of people, remain unresolved. A
renaissance in economic development, led at first by Japan and now increasingly driven
by Chinese growth, has yet to be matched by new modes of diplomatic interaction.
Particularly as China struggles to redefine itself after communism, stubbornly refusing
substantial political reforms toward a less authoritarian state, internal stability in the great
powers becomes a question of regional security. The United States, for its part, seeks to
stabilize the region and force a diplomatic solution by throwing military might behind the
status quo. Hopefully, this policy will continue into the future, creating space for the
contesting parties to reach an amiable solution. Ultimately, however, this task will be
reserved for the parties themselves. The successful reordering of Asia after the Pacific
War remains an open question, and its peaceable conclusion will be one of the great
measures of the new global system’s stability and worth.
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